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The management of complexity is the essence of managerial activities in major 
mining operations. The discussion here centers on how successful managers are in 
converting information into effective action. Even if managers manage their information 
input adequately and achieve an appropriate appreciation of the situations relevant to 
them, they may still to fail to be effective, a matter of crucial importance which has 
received little attention in the literature on information for management because of 
managers’ inability to generate and coordinate action. It is argued here that managers 
can employ at least three possible strategies to achieve effectiveness: (1) structural 
adjustments, (2) designing their organizational interactions, and (3) a good manager-to- 
task fit. To specific related problems of major operations, each strategy is explored and 
courses of action are suggested. The Chuquicamata Mine is used as a case study to 
establish an appropriate framework. Managers are always concerned with questions such 
as "What is missing?" "What needs to be done?" and "Where do I stand in terms of my 
obligations and opportunities?" In operations where many people must act together, 
coordination is crucial. The networks of commitments and the conversations in which 
people participate are becoming larger and more complex, and the complexity of 
organizations has gone beyond the point where it can be controlled without appropriate 
tools. Management indicators are proposed as such a tool, and their purpose is to monitor 
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Profound changes are taking place in the economic, political, social, and 
technological fields where firms operate. Breakdowns resulting from these changes are 
requiring a complete review of the firms’ strategies, structures, and management 
practices. To deal with this emerging reality, current management philosophies need a 
new direction. What was effective in the 1950s, 1960s or even in 1970s, is no longer 
adequate. Changes are demanding a new way of understanding work.
Two extremely powerful forces affecting firms are behind these breakdowns: 
globalization and technology. Both of them have their own implications: the apparent 
collapse of some social institutions and environmental consequences are among them. 
This global scheme shows that comparative advantages based on production factors, such 
as work or natural resources, do not guarantee, by themselves, the success or failure of 
a firm. The major determinant may be its management capacity.
Global competition is displacing competitive strategies. In many places of the world, 
customers have multiple options and they expect firms to offer what they need. So firms 
are looking to develop the necessary competencies to satisfy and, preferably, anticipate 
customers preferences. Additionally, companies are working under pressure to reduce 
delivery time.
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Therefore, corporations must find ways of assuring that different units inside an 
organization work together, easily and coherently. In this context, coordination is a key 
element.
The primary source of complexity, dynamism, and uncertainty in the organization 
is the very nature of its organizational tasks, the demands impose on organizational 
structure mainly by technology. At the same time, technology allows us to face the 
complexity of the world. How many U.S. copper producers might not be in the market 
if the SX/EW process had not been invented?
Two forces behind technology are computers and related structures and processes. 
During the last two decades, a set of technologies, called production automation have had 
a dramatic impact on the production function of the firm. These technologies—Computer 
Aided Design (CAD), Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM), and the like, have 
allowed managers to respond immediately to the ever increasing expectations of 
customers and, also have allowed managers to generate processes of reduction, 
aggregation, representation, and projection of data generated by their operations, from 
a different perspective.
This different perspective is that management, by itself, lacks the primary 
requirements to guarantee efficiency. Managers must not only seek a structure to achieve 
the anticipated results but, more important, they must achieve the appropriate timing and 
effectiveness of those results. Overall, what is required is the profitability of the 
operation.
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Managers have the responsibility of regulating and controlling the organization that 
they manage, and it is clear they cannot know everything that happens inside the 
organization. Since they operate in complex organizations, unavoidably there will be 
dark areas and, therefore, there will be a gap preventing them from obtaining full 
knowledge of the system.
If a manager is not going to abdicate his responsibilities, he must accept that he is 
the one who must establish the degree of control that is necessary for tasks under his 
direction. Here, controlling is the key element.
This process, typical in today’s firm, is the same one that mining companies face in 
their operations. Mining companies, facing coordinating and controlling problems, are 
struggling for survival. In fact, no firm can remain indifferent to the need of getting an 
appropriate level of productivity at costs that allow it to be in the market. So mining 
managers are striving for the viability of their organization. They are also committed 
to complying with certain kinds of requests, while facing unanticipated circumstances and 
striving to keep open future possibilities of the organization.
In cybernetics, variety is the number of possible states of a situation. Here, the 
situation under observation is the interaction of a manager with relevant organizational 
tasks. Intuitively it can be accepted that the variety of the relevant organizational tasks 
is much larger than that of the manager himself. This imbalance suggests that any 
manager naturally both attenuates the variety of the tasks to match his own variety and 
amplifies his own variety to match the variety of the tasks.
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Based on these ideas, the problem of management information can be stated in fairly 
simple terms. It involves, for the manager, two major sets of complexity-matching tasks. 
First, the matching of his limited information-processing capabilities to a quantity of 
potentially relevant information (input) which is vastly beyond these capabilities (the need 
for attenuation). Second, the matching of that same limited capability (as output) with 
the need to achieve a multiplicity of effects in his environment (the need for 
amplification). In practical terms, there is always a matching between a manager’s 
information-processing capacity and the much greater complexity of his information 
space. However, whether this matching is satisfactory or will remain satisfactory is 
another matter. How can a satisfactory matching be brought about? Of course most of 
the complexity relevant to any manager is absorbed by the organization structure 
underlying his tasks. Here it is argued that a manager’s concern is only with the residual 
complexity (relevant to his purposes) left unattended by this structure; this complexity 
defines his information needs. More precisely, his information needs emerge from the 
overall structure of the organization, together with his conversational and cognitive skills 
and styles which couple him to this structure.
In this thesis, therefore, information management is seen as a central problem, 
because effective action is only possible with appropriate informational support. 
Effective action can happen other than by design; it can be the outcome of common sense 
or of chance, but these types of cases are uncommon. Most commonly, the manager has 
an overload of input and an inadequate capacity for output.
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This problem can be reduced by design, by awareness of the problem and by the 
design of information-management processes which can achieve a much better matching 
than that which can normally occur by chance. This view implies that for an effective 
use of information technology, it is necessary to have effective information-management 
processes. It is nonsense to use sophisticated technology to increase the efficiency of 
systems supporting ineffective information-management processes.
Thus the matching problem becomes one of relating perceived information needs and 
effective action (over time) to information-processing capacity. The effective manager 
achieves, in the main, a succesful matching; the manager who is not in control perceives 
a need for more information than he can deal with (receive/process/transmit) to achieve 
a desirable or necessary performance. Few would argue that more understanding and 
more design would not be of benefit.
1.2 Focus
In this study, a new approach is proposed to address the coordinating and controlling 
problem in the mining firm. The conceptual framework underpinning this thesis is the 
management of complexity and, in particular, the strategies used by managers to cope 
with the complexity of their information/action space. These strategies are as follows:
(1) Adjustments to the Organization Structure. This strategy involves designing the 
communication channels in the organization so as to maintain corporate cohesion 
while reducing the information needs of managers.
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(2) The Design of Organizational Conversations. The strategy of improving 
organizational conversations involves the design of processes which develop 
awareness about the commitments made in conversations, and reduce the chances of 
breakdowns in communication.
(3) Manager-to-Task Fit. Finally, the strategy of improving the manager-to-task fit 
entails the design of tools to allow the individual both to grow personally in. relation 
to his organizational tasks and to amplify his output in the same context.
These strategies are aimed at achieving an effective balance between managers’ 
perceived information needs (to achieve stability in their organizational interactions) and 
their limited information-processing capacities. The strategies imply the design of 
effective attenuators of organizational complexity and effective amplifiers of managerial 
action. Our claim is that management indicators are appropriate tools to make explicit 
key aspects to improve the organization’s performance.
In short, the purpose of this thesis is twofold: first, to offer design criteria to 
improve effectiveness of both organizational coordination and control by exploring the 
space of possibilities open for the preceding strategies and second, to apply the derived 
perceptions to the design of coordination-control tools which help to diminish the related 
problem of effective management in mining organizations. The designing process of a 
computer-based tool to face this problem at the Chuquicamata mine is used as a case 
study to show that substantial progress has been made in developing and testing these 
tools for future use.
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The major subject matter of this study can be summarized in four propositions:
(1) A new perspective of viewing the world and business organizations is emerging. 
New technological forces, new ways in which firms compete, and the new animus 
existing in today’s firms demand a new way of understanding work.
This new perspective creates the need to review management practices and, more 
important, to develop a new understanding by adopting more effective 
communication processes and better ways of working with others. An objective of 
this study is then to explore the space of possibilities underlying the organizational 
design and offer a framework for such organizing major mining operations. The 
base used for discussion of managerial aspects is a personal interpretation of the 
work of Gerwin and Kolodny (1992).
Here, the term animus state is not used in its typical psychological sense of feelings 
or emotions; it is used to reveal the form in which people are open to their situation 
in the world from one moment to the next; the term also has the unfortunate 
implication of antagonism or hostility; for this thesis, however, its association will 
be closely related to Mumford’s conception (in Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, 1976, p. 86). Mumford considers the animus state as an effort or 
tendency as directed toward a definite, often inevitable, but not always clearly or 
consciously recognized end. Dreyfus (1991) calls it affectedness, even though he 
recognizes he had some troubles to do it, since the first description of animus state 
was made by Heidegger (in Being in Time, 1962) who used the German word 
Befindlichkeit (something like "How do you find yourself?").
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Understanding and animus states are fundamental phenomena and represent an 
attunement of our situation which opens up certain possibilities and simultaneously 
closes others.
Animus states find expression in the course of conversation. They can be present 
in an individual, in a human group or inside an entire culture. People can feel 
trapped by the animus states of others, that is, there are people who are able to 
impose their animus states on others.
(2) From the manager’s point of view, to consider an approach to observe the chains of 
request-promise in order to make-explicit the conversational network of the 
organization. Managers can achieve an appropriate stability through information 
acquisition (when they require foundations—through statements and reports—to 
generate action), and when the processes inside organizational components generate 
a common perception of what the organization is supposed to do. This "common 
perception" about the organization’s mission is a key element. Managers do not 
ensure the survival of an organization by some external declaration, as with public 
bureaucracies. A firm survives when it is able to face those unanticipated 
circumstances which inhibit its capacity to comply with its commitments; from this 
perspective, the only activities asking for managerial attention are those contributing 
to the survival of the firm.
(3) The work in this study is viewed as a set of promises and a new way of relating to 
superiors as customers to whom both promises and new contributions are made.
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Three specific areas will be covered: promises to customers, the planning process, 
and the animus state of being in charge. In this context, the basic units of 
communication are language and commitments', the general structure of cooperative 
interaction units is what Flores (1982) calls conversation for action.
We might ask how managers can generate effective action. Our claim is that they 
can do so by making explicit a network of commitments that already exist in the 
organization. They may make possible the consistent achievement of cooperative 
action through appropriate amplifiers. Strategies will be discussed to support this 
position. The base used for discussion is a personal interpretation of the work of 
Espejo et al. (1983a, 1983b, 1988).
(4) In this context, it is possible to conceive new kinds of computer-based tools, 
identified as Management Indicators, that could become relevant in management 
practices of mining companies. A management indicator is a complexity filter and 
its purpose is to monitor the organization’s commitments and control key variances 
as close as possible to the source.
Having in mind these propositions, the presentation is divided into four parts.
Part II: Adjustments to the Organization Structure initiates a discussion of specific 
aspects related to this topic. Here, the basic purpose is to establish the intellectual base 
upon which the first strategy—structural adjustments-is derived.
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A major mining operation such as the one at Chuquicamata mine (the case study) has 
three major aspects to consider: the first is related to how effectively the technology is 
being used; the highly capital-intensive nature of the business makes this a crucial point.
The second has to do with concerns over the quality of worklife and the related 
issues of employee motivation, absenteeism, and turnover; in this context a key question 
is, "do we need all the workforce we have?"
The third is related to work-group and higher level organizational issues. There will 
undoubtedly be fewer employees in the operation of the future, and the remaining 
individuals, by virtue of their responsibility for expensive and critical resources, will 
have considerable influence over the process. They must be highly motivated and work 
together as effectively as possible. Again, coordinating is the key element.
Galbraith (1972, 1973) created a scale of increasing coordinating mechanisms that 
were necessary to integrate across the differences between functional departments. These 
functional organization coordinating mechanisms are: rules and procedures, hierarchy 
(common boss), planning, direct contact, liaison roles, task forces, teams, integrators, 
integrating departments, and matrix structures.
If differentiation between functional units is high, an organization may have to be 
further along the coordination scale to achieve the needed integration. Coordination is 
costly. Effective organizations incorporate no more mechanisms than are needed for the 
particular situation.
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Matrix structures provide the most intensive coordination, but at a significant cost: 
in complexity, in increased management, in the number of meetings, and in the stress 
created by intensive lateral communications. The case study will make this apparent.
Our claim is that some of the coordination can be embedded in information 
technology, which merely substitutes one kind of coordination for another. As such, it 
might be argued that total real coordination costs do not increase. More important, it is 
to reverse the trend of continuously subdividing tasks that has characterized most of the 
actions in the past. The following questions are therefore investigated: (1) are some 
structural arrangements better than others for organizing? (2) as organizational boundaries 
collapse both vertically and horizontally, how is management and coordination being 
accomplished? (3) how do managers come to understand the alternatives they have in 
linking social (work organization, people) and technical (technology, equipment in the 
productive system) subsystems, particularly because both are flexible.
Part III: The Management o f Interpersonal Interactions is a discussion of managers’ 
interactions. The discussion centers on individual managers and, particularly, how the 
interdependence level increases in the organization; the objective is to show that the 
organization can be seen as—in Flores’ terms—networks o f commitments, where 
conversation among the organizational actors and commitments to action are key 
elements. Although effective organizational coordination is the appropriate response to 
perceived interdependences, the specific structural response varies with the type of 
organization needed.
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In this context, the planning process and the animus state of being in charge are thought 
as appropriate coordination mechanisms.
Part IV: Information Management, deals with specific and interrelated aspects of two 
topics: information and management. Information is closely intertwined with action, and 
is defined as that which reduces a manager’s uncertainty about relevant situations in the 
world. Managers operate in a world that can be perceived and structured from multiple 
viewpoints; the complexity of the manager’s world is too large to be captured by just one 
well-defined description at one level of resolution. These descriptions constantly shift, 
and so too must the manager’s perception of what is "information" for him.
The case study: The Mining-MIS in the Chuquicamata Mine presents historical 
narrative—management control in the Chuquicamata mine—to describe past actions from 
which a design for the future will come. A key aspect of conversations exploring future 
possibilities is asking questions: "What can be done?" and "What will be the domain of 
actions where the answer lies? When the organizational stability is not that desired, an 
action is required. (Here, organization is any self-contained unit; mining operations 
often constitute an organizational unit which, in turn, is part of a larger organization). 
This action requires a reinterpretation of past activity, seen not as a collection of past 
requests, promises, and achievements, but as interpretations of the whole situation: in 
other words, to answer the question, "What was wrong?" These interpretations are those 
generating a pre-orientation to new possibilities.
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Part V: Improving the Manager-to-Task Fit presents what is offered: the management 
indicator system, an integrative tool that can be used as a mechanism of coordination in 
environments of high interdependence, such as those of major mining operations; an 
integrative tool to attenuate the variety of the organizational tasks to match the manager’s 
variety, and amplify this manager’s variety to match the variety of tasks.
The discussion centers on managerial effectiveness; it is about the use that managers 
can make of their information inputs and outputs and, particularly, how they can convert 
information into effective action.
The management of complexity is seen as the cornerstone of managerial activities. 
Managers are always faced with the problem of matching their limited information- 
processing capacity to the much larger information space implied by their responsibilities 
and commitments. Our claim is that a management indicators system not only is more 
design for information but also more design for organizational coordination.
In this context, an application of management indicators for an open pit mining 
company is shown. The creation of a new device can have major implications; it can 
create a framework for action that would not have previously made sense. In working 
with a new device whose domains are based on an interpretation of data, information, 
goals, operators, and so forth, it is possible to develop patterns of language and action 




2.1 Discourses Supporting Structural Adjustments
From the organizational development point of view, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and 
Galbraith (1973) made a pathway for information management. However, to explore the 
acknowledged links between strategy and productive systems of advanced technology it 
is useful to work within a broader context. The conceptual framework of Figure 2-1 is 
a modified contingency model that grew out of the organization theory and manufacturing 
strategy literatures (Child, 1972; Skinner, 1985, Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992). Company 
and productive system strategy and investments in production technology are related by 
virtue of their interactions with environmental uncertainties, productive system flexibility, 
and performance measurement.
Env i r o n m e n t a 1 Company and 
P r o d u c t i v e  System  
S t r a t e g y
Requ i r e m e n ts P r o d u c t  i on 
T ech n o lo g y  
I n v e s t m e n t sl l n c e r t a i n t  i e s
V w
f o r  F 1 ex i b i 1 i t y
i i I 1 i k
Reduce 1r
R e d e f i n e r P e r f o r m a n c e
4
1
M easurem en t
Figure 2-1 The Conceptual Model (Adapted from Management of Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology by Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992)
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An organization’s task environment is the driving force in that management must 
learn to cope with uncertainties arising in the product market or in the production process 
and its inputs (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992). The central point in this thesis is the 
production process.
Flexibility in a productive system is needed to adapt to uncertainties; it allows a 
corporation to respond effectively to changing circumstances (Proth and Hillion, 1990). 
Theoretical support comes from research conducted by Tombak and DeMeyer (1988) 
who developed an economic model to maximize utility for a firm with a single output, 
and two inputs in which the costs of the flexibility in the manufacturing process are 
considered.
One of the model’s implications is that the need for flexibility goes up as process 
uncertainties increase. Specifically, more random variation in the production function 
coefficients leads to more investment in being able to vary input proportions. 
Empirical support for flexibility’s adaptative characteristic is found in copper mining, 
which dates back thousands of years, and has survived a tremendous number of changes 
through the centuries.
The model’s branch, which represents adaptation, links uncertainty, strategy, and 
flexibility. For example, an uncertainty process for a mining firm is machine downtime; 
since the strategic objective is to meet customer’s needs—the concentrator, for instance- 
flexibility plays a critical role, with flexibility considered in two aspects: volume (amount 
of change in the production level) and time (time to accomplish the change in production.
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2.2 Discourses Supporting Organizational Conversation Improvements
Depending upon context, the expression, "I promise a production cost of 50C/lb," 
can be an answer to a request or an expression of desire. In any case, it manifests a 
future action commitment, the primary concern seems to be whether the promise will be 
kept or not, and it occurs in a context shared by speaker and listener.
Austin (1962) called performative verbs those denoting promise and being used to 
undertake some act. He affirmed that more than a thousand performative verbs exist in 
the English language and, on this basis, his illocutionary verbs taxonomy was advanced. 
In studying these classes of utterances (performatives), he found they do not refer to 
states of the world, but in themselves they constitute acts such as promising, threatening, 
and naming.
Austin argued that the generally accepted view of the truth and falsity of propositions 
was not applicable to many of these speech acts. It does not make any sense to ask 
whether an utterance such as the one above is true or false, but rather whether it is 
felicitous (the term is used by Winograd and Flores, 1986); that is, whether it is 
appropriate to the context in which is uttered.
Expressing a performative verb implies reorganizing social relationships constituting 
the world of those who are participating in a dialogue (Flores, 1982). More precisely, 
it is equivalent to saying that in all these expressions certain kinds of acts are undertaken 
and certain sort of commitment are made.
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Austin’s student, Searle {Speech Acts, 1969), formalized the structure of felicity 
conditions associated with a variety of speech acts, such as promising and requesting. 
In A Taxonomy o f Illocutionary Acts {Expression and Meaning, 1979), Searle classified 
all speech acts as embodying one of five fundamental illocutionary points. These 
categories cover all utterances, not just sentences with explicit performatives verbs such 
as "I promise. and "I d e c l a r e . . F o r  example, a speech act can be a promise even 
though its form may be a simple statement, as in "I’ll be there."
These five categories of illocutionary points are: assertives (when the speaker tells 
the hearer how things are); directives (when the speaker attempts to get the hearer to do 
something which includes both questions and commands); commissives (when the speaker 
commits himself to some future course of action); expressives (when the speaker 
expresses his feelings and attitudes); and, declarations (when the speaker brings about 
changes in the world through his utterances). This last, however, requires a distinction. 
The declaration, "I name you general manager of the company," makes sense if the 
speaker is the CEO and acts in accordance with a context and procedures recognized and, 
as soon as you are named, you are empowered to act as the general manager of the 
company.
Habermas (1979) argues that every language act has consequences for the 
participants, leading to other immediate actions and to commitments for future action.
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In making a statement such as, "the production cost of my area will not be greater 
than..," a speaker is doing something like making a promise—that is, making a 
commitment to act in appropriate ways in the future.
A statement has a different kind of satisfaction condition from a promise; no specific 
action is anticipated, but there is a structure of potential dialogue in the face of a 
breakdown (implications of this term will be stressed later on).
Searle {Foundations o f Illocutionary Logic, 1985) used Austin’s term illocutionary 
acts to name speech which constitutes minimal units of human communication. Some 
examples of illocutionary acts are statements, questions, commands, promises, and 
apologies. His claim is that whenever a speaker utters a sentence in an appropriate 
context with certain intentions, he is performing one or more illocutionary acts.
An illocutionary act is composed of an illocutionary force and a propositional 
content. For example, the following two utterances: "You will do this" and "Do it!" 
have the same propositional content, namely that you will do something; but 
characteristically the first has the illocutionary force of a prediction and the second the 
illocutionary force of an order. Similarly, the two utterances: "Did you finish your 
thesis?" and "What time did the meeting finish?" have the illocutionary force of 
questions, but their propositional contents are quite different. For Searle (1985), at least 
12 dimensions define variations in which illocutionary acts differ one from another. For 
this study, however, the most important three dimensions considered are illocutionary 
point, direction o f fit, and sincerity condition.
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Each illocutionary act has an illocutionary point, and it is in virtue of that point that it 
is an act of that type. Thus the point of a promise is to undertake an obligation; the 
point of a statement is to represent how things are in the world; the point of an order is 
to try to get somebody to do something.
Direction of fit is the difference between words and the world. Some illocutions have 
as part of their illocutionary point to get the words—more strictly, their propositional 
content—to match the world; others to get the world to match the word. For example, 
"the Chuquicamata Mine is one the biggest open pit mines in the world," is an expression 
which has the word-to-world direction o f Jit. Searle (1985) says that the words "true" 
and "false" are the most common terms in English for assessing success in achieving this 
direction of fit.
But if you comply with your promise to have a production cost of 50Clb, it is 
because you coordinated a certain kind of effort and not because your promise was true 
or false. For Searle, some English words used to assess success in achieving the world- 
to-worddirection of fit are: "obeyed," "disobeyed," "complied with," "kept," "fulfilled," 
and "broken" (as in broken promise). Statements, descriptions, assertions, and 
explanations are in the former category; promises, requests, and commands are in the 
latter. In trying to specify the sincerity conditions that are necessary for an act of 
promising, one must refer to the intentional states of the speaker—that is, if the speaker 
believes that it is possible to comply with the promised act and intends to do it, for 
instance.
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In order to understand how the meaning is shared, one must look at the social rather 
than the mental dimension. In general, in the performance of any illocutionary act with 
a propositional content, the speaker expresses some attitude or state, for instance, to that 
propositional content. Thus, belief collects statements, assertions, remarks, explanations, 
postulations, declarations, deductions, and arguments. Intention will collect promises, 
threats, and pledges. Desire or want will collect requests, orders, commands, questions, 
and pleadings. Pleasure will collect congratulations, felicitations and welcomes (Searle, 
1985).
2.3 Conversations for Action
There is an intimate connection between the strategy of structural adjustments and 
that of the design of organizational conversations. As an example of conversational 
analysis, it will be considered as the network of speech acts that constitute 
straightforward conversations for action; that is, those in which an interplay of requests 
and commissives is directed towards explicit cooperative action. The basic course of a 
conversation can be plotted in a diagram like that of Figure 2-2, in which each circle 
represents a possible state of the conversation and the lines represent speech acts.
This is not a model of the mental state of a speaker or listener, but shows the 
conversation as a "dance" (Winograd and Flores, 1986). The lines indicate actions that 
can be taken by the initial speaker (A) and listener (B).
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Figure 2-2 The Basic Conversation for Action (Source: Understanding 
Computers and Cognition by Winograd and Flores, 1986)
This is not a model of the mental state of a speaker or listener, but shows the 
conversation as a "dance" (Winograd and Flores, 1986). The lines indicate actions that 
can be taken by the initial speaker (A) and listener (B). The initial action is a request 
from A to B, which specifies some conditions of satisfaction. Following such a request, 
there are precisely five options: (1) the listener can accept the conditions (promising to 
satisfy them); (2) can reject them; (3) or can ask to negotiate a change in the conditions 
of satisfaction. The original speaker can (4) also withdraw the request before a response; 
(5) or can modify its conditions. Winograd and Flores (1986) say that these are acts 
directly relevant to the structure of completion of the conversation for action.
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There are, of course, other possibilities in which conversational acts themselves are taken 
as a topic; for example, in questioning the intelligibility ("What? I didn’t hear you") or 
legitimacy ("You can’t order me to do that!") of the acts. Each action in turn leads to 
a different state, with its own space of possibilities.
In the "normal" course of events, B at some point asserts to A that the conditions of 
satisfaction have been met (moving to the state labelled 4 in the figure). If A declares 
that he or she is satisfied, the conversation reaches a succesful completion (state 5). On 
the other hand, A may not interpret the situation in the same way and may declare that 
the conditions have not been met, returning the conversation to state 3. In this state, 
either party may propose a change to the conditions of satisfaction, and in any state one 
or the other party may back out on the deal, moving to a state of completion in which 
one or the other can be held "liable" (states 7 and 9).
Winograd and Flores (1986) warn that in examining these recurrent patterns of 
conversation, one must keep in mind that they exist in the domain of the observed 
conversation, not in some mental domain of the participants. A speaker and a listener 
do not apply "conversation pattern rules" any more than they apply "perception rules" 
or "deduction rules." The essential feature of language activity (the process of saying 
and listening) is the thrownness of a person within language (implications of thrownness 
will be stressed on Chapter 5). When people are engaged in successful language activity, 
the conversation is not present-at-hand, as something observed; people are immersed in 
its unfolding, its structure becomes visible only when there is some kind of breakdown.
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In a way it can be said that a manager acts and causes things to happen through 
communication acts—listening, responding explicitly by word, or implicitly by body 
language, reading or writing. It is by these basic means that his intentions can be 
realized as organizational acts. In a way, they are the substance that fills the structural 
channels with life (Espejo and Watt, 1988). From the viewpoint of attenuation, 
managers are constantly engaged in conversations, both inside and outside their 
organizations. These conversations define the local environment of the manager.
While distant information is essentially a summary of specific outcomes elsewhere 
deemed to be relevant to the manager, the local information is richer in content, more 
subtle and multidimensional: it relates to the immediate condition impinging on the 
manager. It is with (by necessity, occasional) local information of distant processes that 
a manager can, among other things, work out a meaning for distant information. Here 
is the attenuation process which permits the separation of the less from the more 
relevant, the trivial issue from the strategic. For the manager, the outcomes of these 
conversations are the structuring of both his activities—with reference to his perceptions 
of personal and organizational stability--and also the organizational tasks.
Indeed, different organizational conversations may lead to very different outcomes, 
which shows the relevance about thinking of them purposefully. Espejo and Watt (1988) 
say this is a classical, circular situation in which the purposes of the manager define the 
conversations of his interest at the same time that these very conversations help to define 
his purposes.
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However circular this argument might be, it is precisely this definition of relevant 
conversations which permits the manager to manage his local information. At this point 
it should be apparent how the design of organizational conversations is intertwined with 
that of adjustments to the organization structure: different organizational structures will 
facilitate or inhibit different conversations.
2.4 Framework for Management Indicators
Foundations supporting design of the Chuquicamata’s mining-management 
information system came from management science—that field concerned with 
mathematical analysis of decision making and with behavioral analyses of human 
conduct—as seen by Anthony (1965), Simon (1976), Forrester (1970) and Beer (1981).
In this thesis, Beer’s work in management cybernetics (Beer, 1959, 1966, 1974, 
1975, 1979, 1981, 1985) is recognized as a contribution that cybernetics—a tradition of 
control, especially of information flows—has made to management. Cybernetics was 
inspired by Wiener (1948) and by von Bertalanffy (1956), even though the latter would 
have published a related article in 1947 (in Anthony, 1988).
The concept was later expanded by Ashby (1956), and a there are number of works 
relating neurophysiology to cybernetics. The main aspect of this discourse is that there 
are fundamental principles of control (self-regulation, stimulus-response or feedback, and 
variety, for instance) which apply to all large systems.
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These principles have been investigated in living systems (such as the brain), in 
electronic systems (such as computers) and in social and economic systems. Checkland
(1980) has pointed out that cybernetic ideas have failed to illuminate the task of 
managers. However, as in any other attempt, it has provided a basis to develop a 
different line of thought on management tradition.
Indeed, Beer has contributed to this tradition since the publication of his book 
Cybernetics and Management (Beer, 1959). But, perhaps, the most significant feature 
of Beer’s work—what this thesis considers central—is his incomplete attempt to make the 
model a reality during Allende’s leadership in Chile.
In 1970, Chile entered into a unique process of social and political development: a 
government committed to fundamental changes had been democratically elected. Most 
supporters agreed that these changes, aimed at a socialist society, had to be implemented 
within the context of the democratic traditions of the country. Events showed that this 
was not a viable approach. However, a particular aspect of this process was the 
development of a plan for the cybernetic regulation of the social economy of Chile (Beer, 
1975, 1979, 1981).
Allende’s government took control of more than 300 firms in a very short time. This 
was known as the industrial social area. They were the biggest firms, and represented 
almost 60% of the country’s industrial production (Espejo, 1980). It was also clear that 
this social area had to be socially responsible. There could be no question of using the 
laws of the market as production regulators; other mechanisms were necessary.
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Obviously, the government’s responsibility was enormous, and a big challenge was 
faced in the design of these new mechanisms (Espejo, 1980). The National Development 
Corporation (CORFO), a large decentralized government agency, was given the 
responsibility of organizing and managing the social area. In fact, CORFO, even before 
Allende’s government, had owned some of the largest firms in the country, and had been 
used by past administrations as a major mechanism for industrial development.
The initiative to consider problems of organizational effectiveness was the 
responsibility of the then general technical manager of the National Development 
Corporation, Fernando Flores (later to be Minister of Economics, Minister of Finance 
and, finally, Secretary of the Cabinet). Apparently it was clear to Flores that the 
effective structuring of a social area implied not only the elaboration of economic, 
financial, and technical policies but also an explicit concern for communication and 
control. That is the cybernetics of the process. Professor Stafford Beer, an authority 
on this subject, was offered and accepted the challenge of participating in this enterprise 
(Espejo, 1980). Flores was named political director of the project, Beer its scientific 
director, and Espejo, senior project manager.
After the coup in September 1973, Flores came to the United States, where he has 
been successfully developing a research program on management and communication. 
Espejo, on his own, went to England, where he has continued developing the cybernetic 
approach of information management.
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PART n
ADJUSTMENTS TO THE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
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Chapter 3
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF 
COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Until recently, the context and the structure of mining organizations were considered 
stable. The Chuquicamata mine changed its structure in 1972, when it changed the 
haulage phase from railroad to trucks and conveyor belts, and in 1989, when an 
important breakdown increased dramatically both the interdependence and uncertainty 
level in its operations. Because of the fall in its ore grade its mining rate had to jump 
from 400,000 tpd to 600,000 tpd.
3.1 Complexity, Uncertainty, and Interdependence
A productive system of advanced technology (PSAT), such as that of Chuquicamata 
mine, for instance, can be highly integrated through information technology that links 
different process technologies and their planning and control systems and materials 
handling systems. These productive systems can also be relatively decoupled if their 
associated strategy has settled on islands of automation as its operative philosophy. Such 
automation islands can be its operational phases (namely, drilling, blasting, loading, 
haulage and crushing). In such cases, required coupling between the islands must be 
accomplished through organizational coordination rather than via information technology. 
However, a range of in-between variations can also exist, with tight or loose coupling, 
via information technology and/or through organizational coordination.
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Some of these organizational and technological interdependencies are within 
departments while others are between departments and/or groups. Cummings and 
Blumberg (1987) consider that when the overall flow of production is accelerated and 
more tightly linked, technical interdependence is greatly increased. Still other 
interdependencies are with units external to the production domain (staff areas within the 
same company, as in human resources, for instance). These interdependencies become 
amplified as organizational boundaries increasingly collapse (Blundell, 1990). This wide 
range of interdependent relationships is experienced as complexity that must be managed 
at the level of departments or groups. If it is not managed, either through information 
technology or organizational coordination, then the interaction effects become 
unpredictable and are manifested as different forms of uncertainty (Gerwin and Kolodny, 
1992).
When the level of analysis moves still lower, to that of the individual and the support 
systems that are closely coupled to individual behavior (training, selection, rewards, for 
instance), process operations uncertainties become the dominant problems to be solved.
Process uncertainties also have impact on the departmental or group level (see 
Figure 3-1), but their impact is subordinated to that created by internal interdependencies 
because the department or group level can usually exercise some control over process 
uncertainties (by rerouting work when machine breakdowns occur). The individual, for 
the most part, cannot.
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Machine breakdowns that create process uncertainties are largely a result of the 











Figure 3-1 Primary Impacts on Different Organizational Levels (Source: 
Management of Advanced Manufacturing Technology by Gerwin and Kolodny, 
1992)
Davis (1983-1984) describes traditional technology as deterministic in that its ways 
of breaking down are understood and corrective actions can be appropriately specified 
and planned. This condition has been supplanted by new technologies that break down 
stochastically; that is, the breakdowns are random and the corrective actions are no 
longer predictable. They can only be determined after diagnosis and analysis by the 
operators. One result is that more automated systems increase rather than decrease the 
dependence of the organization on its members for effective operation (truck drivers in 
open pit mining operations, for instance).
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Hirschhom (1984) illustrated one way in which this dependency, in turn, contributes 
to internally generated uncertainty. With increasing use of teams and task-forces to solve 
problems, more responsibility is delegated to these groups and individuals, which reduces 
the number of rules and specified actions. This increases the experienced uncertainty 
when actions need to be taken for which clear specifications have no longer been 
prescribed.
Changing values, new work philosophies and related changes to the corporate culture 
(Figure 3-1) have a significant impact on individuals and their support systems as well 
as on departmental and organizational levels. Such changes are slow to take place. They 
are experienced as a form of uncertainty that demand new behavior from groups and 
individuals for which very little previous experience exists (participative management 
styles, for instance). Changed values, new philosophies of work, and different corporate 
cultures have important consequences for organizational arrangements and individual 
behaviors in PSAT, but the time horizons are generally long term and the undesirable 
consequences can usually be mitigated by effective education and training and by well- 
thought-through implementation (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
Liu, et al. (1990) suggest that through the use of open processes and conceptually 
new integrative approaches, organizations will attempt to manage complexity in the 
future rather than reduce it. Current organizational design applies two principles to avoid 
complexity. The first one is to divide a real situation into specific aspects, including 
technical, human and economic.
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The second is to stabilize production processes into routines by buffering 
organizations from environmental turbulence (Thompson, 1967). But the "reduction" of 
complexity leads to some major dangers. The first principle ignores the fact that the 
sharp-edged frontiers between the different conceptual divisions are the very places where 
real interactions in work and life settings occur. One example of this first principle is 
that technical problems are formulated and solved without reference to the social 
consequences they induce. Thus, organizations are not as efficient as they could be if 
sociotechnical facts are taken into account (Trist, 1981).
The second principle leads to the rigid shaping of organizations to fit one given 
situation; as a consequence, it is prevented from becoming flexible and adaptative. 
Specialization and coordination, or differentiation and integration are the essence of 
organization. These variables need particular attention in PS AT because traditional 
boundaries are collapsing rapidly.
3.2 Organizational Structrure
For organization theorists (Dessler, 1989; Rodriguez, 1991; Gerwin and Kolodny, 
1992) who have studied structure by comparative analysis (that is, by comparing the 
arrangements in different organizations at a particular time), structure is usually viewed 
as the result of a particular imperative, with technology and environmental uncertainty 
being the determining variables most frequently cited. (Size is a third variable that has 
often been researched but it has less explanatory power than technology or uncertainty).
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Both relationships are complicated by questions about what level of analysis to 
address in the organization and by an increasing realization that the relationship is more 
complex than the independent variable-dependent variable models that have dominated 
so much organizational research (Fligstein 1985; Hall, 1987).
Hall (1987) says that as the explanations of structure have been considered, none has 
been totally correct and none totally incorrect. Organizations are structured in a context 
and, as a consequence, there are multiple explanations of structure. Structure has usually 
been studied by disaggregating it into discrete variables (complexity, coordination, 
control, formalization, centralization, configuration) that can be measured across 
comparable situations, usually from large questionnaire samples that can be analyzed 
statistically. Although it has seldom been researched, the relationships between structure 
and other variables can also be in the opposite direction to those mentioned above 
(Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992). An organization with a tradition of autonomy within its 
division might find it especially difficult to get it to cooperate in offering an integrated 
response, even though that may be precisely what its environment requires.
An alternative organizational perspective views structure less in terms of explanation 
and more in design terms (Gerwin, 1981b; Kast and Rosenzweig, 1988). This is a 
systems view of structure. A systems view of the environment includes considerations 
of how the environment can itself be manipulated, the political processes involved in 
strategic choice (Child, 1972), and the fact that there is organizational choice (Trist et 
al., 1963).
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That is, the idea that management and workers can choose among structural alternatives 
and can influence the technological arrangements rather than have them determined for 
them by technical experts. This is a holistic perspective that views structure more as a 
configuration of design parameters (Mintzberg, 1983) than as single relationships. Miller
(1981) refers to this view as different organizational configurations or adaptive patterns 
that are richly described by the dynamic integration among variables of environment, 
organization and strategy.
Ranson, et al. (1980), define structure as a complex medium of control which is 
continually produced and recreated in interaction and yet shapes that interaction: 
structures are constituted and constitutive. Maturana and Varela (1980) see the 
organizational structure in similar terms, and derived from biology the term autopoiesis. 
Autopoiesis occurs in nature—the natural environment—and means basically self- 
correcting or self-adjusting. Structure, then, should be seen as more dynamic than static, 
as more action oriented. Weick (1969) refers to organizing rather than organization and 
to structuring and structuration. The important ideas are that systems are built from 
interaction and rules, that such resources as action are tools people use to enact their 
organizations, and, most important, that structures are both the medium and the outcome 
of interaction. People create structural constraints, which then constrain them. 
Structuration pays equal attention to both sides of that structuring process (constraining 
and being constrained), whereas earlier notions emphasized one side and neglected the 
other (Weick, 1990).
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This dynamic perspective of structure tends to be more individually oriented than 
organizational (Scott, 1990). However, it becomes increasingly relevant when the 
traditional variables that constitute structure change not only because of a changing set 
of environmental conditions or changes in technology but when the members of an 
organization themselves change significantly because they are in continuous learning 
modes (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
This is a currently highly desired mode for operators in a range of PSAT situations. 
Pay-for-knowledge systems that support many new organizational arrangements, for 
example, foster continuous learning. In such "learning environments,1' the concept of 
structuring may be more useful than that of structure. The idea of learning environments 
is not confined to conceptualization at the level of the individual. It will increasingly be 
a way to think about organizations with high adaptibility requirements.
3.2.1 Technology and Structure. The relationship of technology to structure has been 
extensively studied by organizational theorists (Hage, 1969; Hickson et al. 1969; Mohr, 
1971; Khandwalla, 1974; Davis and Taylor, 1976; Dewar and Hage, 1978; Gerwin, 
1981b; Barley, 1986; Scott, 1990; Sproull and Goodman, 1990; Weick, 1990; Gerwin 
and Kolodny, 1992). However, there is no definitive conclusion in these works. The 
relationship is complex.
The ability to clearly articulate it is compounded by the lack of clear definitions for 
both technology and structure, particularly the former. Gerwin (1981b) cites ten 
different studies that use eight different measures of technology.
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Most research into the technology-structure relationship assumes one overarching 
causality: the structure of an organization is directly dependent on the organization’s 
technology (Woodward, 1965; Thompson, 1967; Hickson et al. 1969). Management’s 
role, under this view, is a passive one (Gerwin, 1981a); that is, the structural 
arrangements follow once the technology is decided.
If technology determines structure, then the choice of the appropriate organizational 
structure should follow from a clear statement about the characteristics of the particular 
technology or technologies. In fact, such choice has been quite problematic, not just 
because of the wide variety of automated manufacturing technology arrangements that can 
exist, but also because the frequently espoused technology-structure relationship is less 
and less clear with each additional research study (Gerwin, 1981b; Scott, 1990).
Emery (1978a), for instance, offers a complex view of technology with respect to 
organization. He says that, on the one hand, it is a boundary condition of the 
organization’s social system mediating between the ends of an enterprise and the external 
environment. However, technology is also seen as ''belonging" to an enterprise, if only 
from the fact that it is excluded from similar control by other enterprises. It therefore 
represents the organization’s "internal environment." Hirschhom (1984) takes a position 
somewhere between Emery and technological determinism. He conceives of technology 
less as a determinant of structure and more as a constraint on organization design 
decisions.
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Scott (1990) suggests that both variables need to be rethought and the relationship 
reconceptualized. He adds that now, after much dissension, we can draw some 
conclusions about the effects of technical uncertainty and complexity on structural 
features of organizations; his basis is composed of 30 or more empirical investigations. 
Models of contingency, broadly defined, continue to provide the dominant theoretical 
paradigm. A contingency model of organizations states that there is no one best way of 
organizing (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). How one should organize depends on several 
variables, particularly the ones that have already been identified such as environmental 
uncertainty and technology.
Contingency models also hold that all ways of organizing are not equally effective. 
Again, depending upon particular technology in place or the state of competition, one 
way of organizing might lead to high performance while another might spell failure for 
a firm (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
3.2.2 Other Influences. Research into contingency models has tended to concentrate on 
the effects of a single variable (technology or environmental uncertainty, for instance) 
on organizational structure. However, it is in the interaction of several contingencies that 
the unique structure of each organization is established; for instance, in the way a 
specific technology is combined with a particular set of job and organization design 
arrangements, appropriate training and development systems, and all this placed within 
the unique context of that organization’s particular labor market.
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National societal factors are another contextual contingency condition that can have 
strong influence on work organization and skill structure. Structural resistance, or 
inertia, can be an important factor constraining organizational structure.
3.2.3 Interdependence and Coordination. Another characteristic uncertainty that a 
company experiences is when its technical and internal operations become quite complex. 
Its need to respond quickly increases, and its links to customers and suppliers tighten; 
in effect, its need to manage a much higher level of interdependence increases (Campbell 
and Warner, 1990). See Figure 3-1.
Theoretically, these are not uncertainty dimensions since a firm can match the variety 
and complexity of high levels of interdependence with appropriate structural design, 
integrated information systems and appropriately skilled personnel (Ashby, 1956). In 
practice, this is a continuous catch-up exercise, particularly because PS AT are constantly 
racing ahead of the organization’s structural capacity (Liu et al. 1990). This is 
experienced within the firm as just that much more uncertainty to deal with. Although 
effective organizational coordination is the appropriate structural response to perceived 
interdependence, the specific structural response varies with the type of coordination 
needed. Thompson (1967) identified three types of interdependences—pooled, sequential, 
and reciprocal—and proposed a different type of coordination appropriate for each- 
standardization, planning, and mutual adjustments. Rhenman (1973) suggested that an 
organization must achieve "consonance" when it experiences dissonance either between 
itself and its environment or between subsystems within the organization.
T-4099 40
It has several ways to achieve such consonance: by mapping (reflecting the 
environment in its own structure); by matching (understanding the environment or the 
neighboring systems causing the dissonance and complementing them); by joint 
optimization and by joint coordination (using a combination of the previous approaches 
to map for exploitation and match for cooperation), and by dominance. In the last, either 
by (1) acquiring greater variety than that of the dissonance creating situation "to force 
down their variety": (2) becoming better able to adapt to changing circumstances than 
competitors through "survival of the fittest": or (3) developing a "leading system" that 
can lead or control others. There also are other approaches (as that of Kaplinsky, 1984). 
In all of them, however, it is the argument that technology is continuously increasing in 
complexity and, as it does, the need for accompanying organizational coordination and 
integration increases.
3.2.4 The Collapse of Organizational Boundaries. Rapidly increasing interdependencies 
between the plant and its external environment are collapsing traditional boundaries at 
a rapid rate (SME Sociotechnical Study Commitee, 1989). Gerwin and Kolodny (1992) 
argue that this breaking down of boundaries will be one of the key organizational 
manifestations of the 1990s. Many of the environment’s uncertainties are entering 
directly into the organization and are no longer capable of being buffered at the 
boundary. Nonroutine activities will assume more importance than they did when it was 
possible to seal off the technical core of the organization from uncertain events.
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High interdependence is managed by effective coordination. The most inclusive 
coordination is achieved by removing the actual boundaries between the units requiring 
integration. This has already manifested itself within the productive systems of a number 
of mining operations, both within the firm’s boundaries (the relationship between the 
operations and maintenance areas, for instance), as well as across them (the just-in-time 
systems in maintenance services, for example). This increased interdependence requires 
a level of mutual interaction that is impeded by conventional organizational boundaries.
Of more salience is how the boundaries are falling within the organization itself. It 
is alternatively referred to as delayering, demassing, and flattening out (Gerwin and 
Kolodny, 1992). The entire middle is disappearing. This is the vertical dimension of 
the change. Gerwin and Kolodny (1992) say that it could be called delegating 
responsibility downward, but that might be a too charitable interpretation.
Cutting costs is a large part of the motivation, but it is not just cost cutting that is 
driving the activity. It is more that the control exercised in traditional organizations by 
middle ranks of supervision and management is less needed now, partly because workers 
expect more challenge from their work and need less control, but mostly because the 
spread of information technology has made control an easier and cheaper process. For 
instance, truck drivers at Chuquicamata mine must be given information about shift and 
day’s targets; this information must be put in very visible places.
The data to understand and make relevant decisions are available at the top of the 
corporation and at the operator level, and often simultaneously.
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Control can be exercised by setting objectives and knowing that those affected will have 
the data to confirm if they have been accomplished. Control is best achieved by getting 
the information first to those who are actually doing the job so that they can exercise the 
needed control themselves.
The pressure to break vertical boundaries is not just top down. With the increasing 
use of teams, sometimes without supervisors, many traditional vertical roles are assumed 
within the team. It becomes less clear then whether responsibility has been delegated 
downwards or assumed upwards (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
Haywood and Bessant (1990) say that integrating technologies require closer 
functional integration, so they imply shorter hierarchies and greater vertical integration 
in organizational structure. They suggest that to exploit the full benefits of a rapidly 
responsive and flexible system it is necessary to create managerial decision-making 
structures that closely involve the front-line and that delegate a high degree of autonomy.
T-4099 43
Chapter 4
THE FIRST STRATEGY: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTS
4.1 The Organizational Structure as a Complexity Filter
The organizational structure is a (two-way) bridge between the manager and 
situations of his concern. It can be seen as a complex of relationships—channels, loops, 
linkages, and of commitments—responsibilities, accountabilities. One of the meanings 
of the structure, from the information point of view, is to produce many transformations 
from multiple to single variables so as to allow the managerial task; in this sense it is a 
sponge of complexity (Espejo, 1983b).
Data are absorbed by the structure, whereas the manager is generally remote from 
the events themselves; he can only have an appreciation of organizational situations, and 
different structures are responsible for different appreciations. Hence, the complexity 
relevant to managers is an outcome of the actual organizational strategies and the related 
structures giving particular forms to the tasks relevant to these managers. This 
complexity may imply several aggregations between a manager and the situations of his 
concern; the more levels of aggregation the more remote the manager is from the events. 
This explains why a symphony orchestra is viewed as an ideal organization; only one 
communication channel exists between the director and performers, and the sheet music 
is the plan. In other words, the information/action space of the managers depends upon 
the organizational structures which define and perform the tasks of concern to them.
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The nature of the organizational structure as a complexity filter derives from two 
facts: the large complexity of organizational tasks and the very limited information 
processing capacity of managers, that is, their comparatively low complexity. The 
matching of these two complexities, a necessity if tasks are going to be consistent with 
agreed policies, requires several structural levels in between those responsible for the 
final implementation of policies and those responsible for their definition.
In general, organizational policies are unfolded several times before reaching the 
front line. People operating in the later levels give closure by themselves to multiple 
information transactions with no reference to levels, thus defining their own functional 
autonomy. Their actions occur in the context of a higher structural level, concerned with 
implementation at a more general level, which includes a degree of functional autonomy. 
People at this high level may also be encapsulated within a yet higher level, with some 
functional autonomy, and so on.
The transactions, and the related data, absorbed at each structural level are usually 
informationless to the levels above. If the corporate managers have effective linking 
mechanisms to the level below, and this level also has effective linking mechanisms to 
its own lower level, and so forth, then corporate managers would need to give closure 
only to information loops emerging at their own structural level and those transmitted by 
the immediate lower level. All other organizational transactions would be essentially 
informationless; hence the filtering role of the structure (Espejo, 1983b).
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Thus, the organizational structure, as a filter of events, is defining data structures; 
it is defining the data that are relevant de facto to levels and functions in the 
organization. Undefined distribution of functional autonomy, with reference to the 
complexity of organizational tasks, may produce information flows for which the 
structure does not have absorption capacity. If this is the case, performance of the 
organization may not reach its expectations.
For the purposes of attenuation, that is, to have adequate appreciation of the 
organizational tasks, and amplification, that is, to generate and coordinate organizational 
action, adjustments to the organization structure can make information management more 
effective. These changes can be major or minor, suggesting indeed very different 
processes. Appropriate changes in these structures should increase the effectiveness of 
the organization as a whole, and the manager’s ability to match relevant complexity.
Although organizational structure is usually conceived of in terms of the larger 
organizational unit, the corporation or division, the concepts of structure and structuring 
also apply at the level of units or work groups. At each of these levels there are 
patterned behaviors and interactions, rules, procedures and norms, reporting 
relationships, fixed configurations of workers and machines and systems, skill sets and 
qualification levels, and even consistent education and training programs. Structure and 
structuring also apply at the worker or operator level. Structure does not define all the 
activities that take place. In operations with programmable and flexible equipment, 
operators are expected to handle exceptions and deal with unpredictable events.
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4.2 Sociotechnical Systems
Computers and information technology have made the information needed to monitor 
and control activities available simultaneously to higher management, to supervision, and 
to individual workers. The information gathering and control functions that have been 
the preserve of middle management have become less necessary. At the same time, 
demands from employees at lower levels of the organization to have a say in decisions 
that affect them have met with the need from top management to decentralize some of 
their responsibility and delegate some of their decisions downward. In this environment, 
hierarchical behavior and thinking have become outdated. The combined result has been 
the widespread collapse of vertical boundaries in the middle levels of the organization.
The pressure on the middle comes from the sides and from the top and bottom. The 
need to respond rapidly to market, customer, and environmental changes has collapsed 
the boundaries between plants and suppliers, between plants and customers, and between 
production departments and engineering and service areas. Structural and process 
arrangements that facilitate lateral relationships and communications are increasingly 
important aspects of organizing.
There is a third source of pressure on the middle of productive organizations and it 
comes from within. It results from the interdependencies between tightly coupled 
information, technology-based productive processes approaches that are linked to form 
integrated systems (materials handling technologies, such as crushing-belts systems, 
planning and control systems, and communications systems, such as local area network).
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There is a less tightly integrated variation of the foregoing in which productive 
systems are combined with organizational coordination mechanisms (teams and 
coordinators, for instance) to link more loosely coupled islands of automation with each 
other and with the less automated functions in the productive system.
These interdependencies plus product-market and process uncertainties have made it 
very difficult for the traditional center to hold in traditional organizational units. 
Dramatic changes are taking place in the way work is organized. The changing social 
systems and technical systems are creating a context for a new paradigm of work, 
referred to here as sociotechnical systems. The new paradigm is emerging in all levels 
of the organization: the plant level, the individual level, the departmental level, and the 
group or "middle” level; but it is in the last of these that it is experienced most strongly. 
The middle level—the group or unit level~is the focus of this study.
Technological determinism has been the basis of design of productive organizations, 
particularly process technologies (Daft, 1989). In PSTA of mining operations, the 
process of feeding ore into the concentrator follows a specific route that dictates the 
sequence of operations that will take place. The translation of these sequenced steps- 
drilling, blasting, loading, haulage, crushing, and so on—follows a determined solution 
that is assumed to be the optimal way to carry out the production process. In discrete 
production, a similar logic applies. Even though the operations are not continuous, the 
"optimal" sequence for machining a part or assembling a component will follow a path 
that would look similar across a variety of factories.
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Gerwin and Kolodny (1992) consider that a technically determined solution maps out 
the essential technical design of the production system. The work organization, job 
designs, organizational arrangements, rewards, and support systems—that is, the total 
social system—are then put in place to fit the technical solution and make up the total 
production system. This is referred to as technological determinism. It dictates that 
social systems will adapt to technical systems. As the building blocks of the social 
systems,,people will be fitted in as necessary to complete the technical design. At times 
they may have machine-like roles, as when they are less costly than or more flexible than 
a machine alternative, whereas at other times they may serve as extensions of the 
machines. Sociotechnical theorists advocate an alternative perspective. They suggest 
that organizations should be designed so that people are in roles complementary to 
machines rather than being extensions of machines (Jordan, 1979). They maintain that 
there is always more than one way to design the technical system and some of the 
alternative ways lead not to just better social system solutions but also to more effective 
global designs. Emery and Trist (1960) developed sociotechnical systems theory from 
experiences in the British coalfields in the late 1940s. To many colliery managers in the 
United Kingdom, the solution to inadequate production output was to mechanize the 
mines by adding new technology as it became available (conveyor belts, better 
explosives, undercutting equipment) and by restructuring the work away from historically 
inefficient but cohesive work group arrangements toward scientific management methods 
that had arisen in the automobile and other industries in the United States.
T-4099 49
"Longwall" methods were devised that divided up the skills of the previously cross- 
trained miners into highly specialized job categories, and supervisors were installed to 
coordinate their activities (Trist and Bamforth, 1951). Output decreased, but not 
anywhere near the proportions the equipment designers and engineers expected or 
maintained was possible from the new technology and work structures (Trist et al. 
1963). Managers, in some collieries, with assistance from miners and unions, created 
what Trist and Bamforth (1951) referred to as "composite" approaches. They utilized 
the new technology but maintained some of the better aspects of the previous work group 
structures. A large number of design variations were attempted in different mines. 
Team size, for instance, ranged from as few as eight people to as many as forty two 
accross the three shifts. Several very effective variations resulted, both in terms of 
productivity and in the work satisfaction they provided to miners and managers.
They became the basis of "emergence of a new paradigm of work" (Emery, 1978b). 
Trist (1981) described his observations of these innovations at a new coal seam in a 
colliery he visited in the following terms: the work organization of the new seams was 
a novel phenomenon consisting of relatively autonomous groups interchanging roles and 
shifts and regulating their affairs with a minimum of supervision. Cooperation between 
task groups was everywhere in evidence; personal commitment was obvious, absenteeism 
low, accidents infrequent, productivity high. There was a sharp contrast between the 
atmosphere and arrangements on these faces and those in the conventional area of the pit, 
where negative features characteristic of the industry were glaringly apparent.
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Workers told Trist that to adapt to the technical conditions in the new seam, they had 
evolved a form of work organization based on practices common in unmechanized days 
when small groups, who took responsibility for the entire cycle, had worked 
autonomously. These practices had disappeared as the pits became progressively more 
mechanized in relation to the introduction of longwall working. This method had 
enlarged the scale of operations and led to aggregates of men of considerable size having 
their jobs broken down into one-man, one-task roles, while coordination and control had 
been externalized in supervision, which had become coercive. Now they had found a 
way at a higher level of mechanization of recovering the group cohesion and self­
regulation they had lost and of advancing their power to participate in decisions 
concerning their work arrangements. The situation is familiar in mining operations. The 
lesson of the composite system is that it is not necessary to further bureaucratize an 
organization each time it adopts a new technology. "Organizational choice" exists.
Sociotechnical systems theory is established at three levels in society: the primary 
work system, whole organization system, and macrosocial systems (Trist, 1981). The 
interest in PS AT will focus the attention to the primary work level.
Many variations on the theory, principles, and design approaches of sociotechnical 
systems (Emery and Trist, 1960; Trist, 1981) exist, sometimes under quite different 
names. Davis (1983) and Walton (1980, 1985) call them high commitment work 
systems; for Lawler (1986), they are high involvement systems; for Emery (1978b), they 
are a new paradigm of work.
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Another range of names refers to organization designs that are sometimes similar to 
sociotechnical systems and sometimes quite different. Gerwin and Kolodny (1992) 
mention the following names: participative management, employee involvement, 
workplace democracy, high performance management, new human resource management, 
work structuring, workplace reform. The term "quality of working life" (Davis and 
Chems, 1975; Kolodny and van Beinum, 1983) is often used in conjunction with 
sociotechnical systems.
4.2.1 The Design of Sociotechnical Systems. A sociotechnical systems approach to the 
design of organizations is based on several broad themes, each of which is further 
elaborated as follows: (1) the organization is an open system in continuous interaction 
with its environment, (2) the design of organizations is based on joint optimization of the 
social and technical systems, and (3) there is a choice in organizational design. The last 
theme rejects the classical idea that there is a technological imperative that determines 
the design of work organizations (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
The concept of organization as an open system has been adopted from biology (von 
Bertalanffy, 1969; Maturana, 1975, 1989; Luhmann, 1978, 1983; Maturana and Varela, 
1980, 1984; Rodriguez, 1991) to recognize that organizations are complete undertakings 
with inputs, outputs, throughputs, and feedback mechanisms to monitor and adapt their 
performance. Unlike biological entities, organizations are capable of changing their state 
(Buckley, 1967; Maturana, 1970, 1975, 1989; Luhmann, 1978,1983; Maturana and 
Varela, 1980, 1984) in a relatively short time.
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Organizations are embedded in an external environment that shapes the values of the 
members, particularly those of the dominant coalition (Thompson, 1967) and may expose 
them to high degrees of uncertainty (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) and turbulence (Emery 
and Trist, 1965).
Organizations are collections of individuals formed into organizational units that can 
be viewed as " minisocieties" (Luhmann, 1978; Davis, 1982; Rodriguez, 1991) with 
highly differentiated roles, structures, rewards, and processes for interacting, developing 
and sustaining themselves. They are purposeful (Ackoff and Emery, 1972) and capable 
of following alternative paths—the principle of equifinality—to the achievement of their 
objectives.
Organizations are social inventions or socially constructed realities (Barnard, 1938; 
Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Parsons, 1966). They are learning entities, sometimes 
learning to maintain the status quo, sometimes learning to change it continuously or 
drastically in the light of changing contexts, values, and objectives. Open systems theory 
is a broad general theory, and sociotechnical systems theory, as an organizational theory, 
is a subset of open systems theory (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
Joint optimization is a second basis of a sociotechnical systems approach. Joint 
optimization puts the social and technical systems on a more equal footing in the design 
process. It has always been accepted that the first step in the design of a production 
process is to lay out the logical flow of the technology to achieve the desired final 
product, as in the input-throughput-output sequence previously mentioned.
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Workers in the process are then added as needed, usually when it is less expensive to add 
a worker than to add an additional technological component (installing an operator to 
monitor a machine because automatic monitoring is too expensive, as at a truck 
weighting station in an open pit mining operation, for instance).
At this point, the technical system is optimized for efficiency, for the cost of the 
investment in technology, for the quality of the output, and so on. The workers and the 
social systems are seen as extensions of the technical system, as necessary appendages 
to make the system function properly (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
Under joint optimization, there is an understanding that there may be trade-offs 
whereby giving up some efficiencies on the technical side to realize social system benefits 
may yield a better joint outcome (for instance, allowing truck drivers to have the coffee 
break in company snack-rooms rather than in their trucks on the road). Joint 
optimization may be an optimistic objective, since optimizing any system or subsystem, 
technical or social, is difficult. However, achieving a "good fit" between the technical 
and social subsystems is a feasible objective, and within the belief system of 
sociotechnical design it will result in a more effective organization than an approach that 
optimizes only the technical or the social subsystem or an approach that makes one 
subsystem subordinate to the other.
Joint optimization has acquired new significance under computer-based technology. 
With the programmability, flexibility, and responsiveness that is now being approached 
in the technology, it is conceivable to design a desired social system outcome.
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Walton (1983) cites, for instance, an organization structured around teams, without 
incurring extra cost for the technology or without sacrificing technical objectives. 
Kolodny (1990) considers that the number of alternative organizational arrangements is 
expanding. The challenge for designers will be how to optimize two subsystems each 
flexible in the range of alternatives they can assume.
Gerwin and Kolodny (1992) consider that organizational choice is the cornerstone of 
sociotechnical systems design. An organization exposed to a changing and turbulent 
external environment must constantly adapt to fit the externally driven changes, among 
which will be found changing societal and managerial values. Those values inform 
choices about the direction and kind of adaptation. Earlier organizational theory 
positions maintained that there was one best way of organizing, a perspective still widely 
held (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
The concept of organizational choice is in sharp contrast to that position. Even after 
value positions are established and organizational philosophies are identified, 
organizational designers still have a choice of technical and social subsystem parameters 
that will accomplish the desired objectives. The types of technology, its first and second 
order consequences (Walton, 1983), the assumptions held about people’s learning 
abilities, the degree of autonomy granted to operators and supervisors (Klein, 1991), are 
among many decisions that can affect sociotechnical design. Organizational choice is the 
guiding design philosophy.
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Sociotechnical systems have a well-developed design methodology (Emery and 
Thorsrud, 1969, 1976; Davis, 1982; Taylor and Asadorian, 1985; Gerwin and Kolodny, 
1992) that has had most of its application in production areas where work tends to flow 
in a linear sequence from operation to operation.
4.2.2 The Primary Work System. The unit of analysis for sociotechnical system design 
is a bounded subsystem (Trist, 1981) that transforms an input into an output. The 
boundaries are drawn where there is a natural break between the interdependencies of one 
subsystem and those of another. Although there will always be some interactions 
between subsystems, the internal interdependencies will be greater than those external to 
the subsystem. This subsystem is referred to as a primary work system; it is a 
sociotechnical system comprising a technical subsystem and a social subsystem.
Small and large primary work systems may exist side by side in the same plant or 
organization. For example, the loading phase at Chuquicamata mine has about 150 
workers, whereas the hauling operation phase has more than 500 workers and requires 
up to four times as much physical area. The entire area across all shifts in each of these 
operational phases could be considered a primary work system; however, complications 
of holding meetings and coordinating between shifts lead to poor communication and 
dissastisfaction on the larger teams; in some cases then, each shift would more likely be 
the relevant unity of analysis. There is, consequently, some discretion in choosing the 
unit of analysis/design. But, in considering the chain loading-haulage-crushing, it is 
possible see other implications.
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This sequential dependence of each team on the previous team is sufficiently high 
that, under this definition, the entire line in each shift would probably have constituted 
a primary a work system. Again, there is some choice as to what constitutes the basic 
unit of analysis of primary work system.
4.2.3 The Work Group. The work group associated with a primary work system 
constitutes the social subsystem part of the particular sociotechnical system. As an 
organizational entity, it is in sharp contrast to the single job and the superior-subordinate 
dyad that lies at the base of traditional organizational design (Gerwin and Kolodny, 
1992).
Rice (1958) defined a work group as "the smallest number that can perform a whole 
task and can satisfy the social and psychological needs of its members." He viewed it 
as "the most satisfactory and efficient group" from the viewpoint of both the task to be 
performed and those performing it.
It was from the field-based development of sociotechnical systems in the United 
Kingdom, India, and Norway (Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Rice, 1958; Emery and 
Thorsrud, 1969) that the concept of "semiautonomous" work teams evolved (Herbst, 
1962; Susman, 1976; Gulowson, 1979). Semiautonomous work teams have sufficient 
autonomy to regulate their own affairs while remaining connected to the organization, 
sometimes through a supervisor, sometimes through planning and objective setting 
systems, and always through the interdependencies they have with other units around the 
task itself so that they are never completely autonomous (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
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The size and tasks of a primary work system dictate the size of the organizational 
unit or work group. Wide variations in size can be expected. Furthermore, assumptions 
about the roles of team members, their training and cross-training (when appropriate), 
the levels of multiskilling sought, and the role of the team supervisor can all moderate 
the size of the team. A fundamental belief in sociotechnical systems design is that people 
are capable of regulating themselves, that they do not have to be externally controlled 
by supervisors or control mechanisms to accomplish their tasks or to do good work. 
Work groups in sociotechnical systems designs have been referred to as semiautonomous 
or self-regulating to reflect the responsibilities they assumed for various aspects of their 
performance.
The term "semiautonomous" is a cumbersome and uncomfortable one, because it 
opens a non-specific question, "How much autonomy?" (Klein, 1991). Alternative names 
have evolved: self-regulating work groups, self-managing or self-directed work teams, 
and self-maintaining organizational units (Davis, 1982).
4.3 Design Principles
Chems (1976) developed a list of several principles of organization design based on 
sociotechnical theory. The discussion that follows is selective rather than quantitative.
4.3.1 Boundary Management and Variance Control. Controlling key variances as close 
to the source as possible is one of the basic design principles of sociotechnical systems. 
Variances are deviations from goals or objectives.
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They require corrective action. They are the exceptions, out-of-specification conditions, 
errors, and many other ways in which things can go wrong at any point in an operation 
or activity. They generally reflect the uncertainty associated with process operations, but 
they can also result from unpredictable problems.
If the variances are controlled where they arise, quality can be considerably improved 
because deviations are not transmitted beyond the boundaries of the unit in question. 
Workers who create the variances or who are the first to encounter them should correct 
them. The high costs of having supervisors to coordinate corrective action because the 
variances are detected in places where they do not originate are eliminated or 
considerably reduced.
Organizational units or primary work systems should be designed so that those 
closest to where the variances arise have the necessary information, skills, knowledge, 
authority, and commitment to detect them and control them. The boundaries of a 
primary work system should be drawn to minimize the export of variances across that 
system’s boundary. This complements the earlier stated concept of drawing a primary 
work system’s boundaries where there is a natural break between the interdependenceies 
of one system and those of another or, restated, drawing the boundary to contain the 
system’s interdependencies to the extent possible (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
4.3.2 Organizational Philosophy and Values. Sociotechnical designs are based on values 
that are explicit and often reflected in organizational philosophy statements or charters 
(Poza, 1983).
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Every organizational design has inherent assumptions about people. More often than not 
they have not been made explicit for members of the organization. Sociotechnical 
systems designs, in recognition that their open systems character makes them a product 
of their environment, usually have embedded into their design process one of exploration 
of changing values in their environment and of its impact on their organization and 
members.
This "search process" (Emery and Emery, 1973; Clarkson, 1981; Weisbord, 1987) 
confronts the organization with current environmental trends and future directions that 
are then compared with current and sometimes historical practice. The identified "gap" 
then serves as impetus to address the question of whether current practice will allow the 
organization to proceed effectively toward the mapped out future or whether changes are 
in order. This process exposes the organization to the value positions of the key decision 
makers and to the compatibility of those values with environmental trends as well as with 
the environmentally influenced and changing positions of the organization’s members.
4.3.3 Compatibility. This principle means that the design outcome and the design 
process used to achieve the outcome should be compatible. It is difficult to achieve a 
participative outcome with a nonparticipative design process ("How you start is how you 
finish"). Many plants interested in engaging in innovative redesign now take teams of 
employees on visits to other innovative plants and to conferences describing such 
innovations to change their expectations and expand their conceptual understanding about 
what is possible both in structural arrangements and in the ways how they will operate.
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After extensive education, these "design teams" take a key role in the design of a new 
work structure capable of building in the very kind of participative behavior in which the 
teams were engaged during their educational process.
4.3.4 Multiskilling. Multiskilling is intended to develop more functional competencies 
in workers than they might utilize at any one time. This allows workers to adapt to 
uncertainties and unanticipated changes. Within a team of multiskilled workers, a high 
degree of team adaptability can be realized. However, the need for multiskilling comes 
from an activity or operation which is characterized as having a variable load of working. 
Multiskilling is usually supported by a skill-based pay system or a pay for knowledge 
system (Gupta et al., 1986; Lawler and Ledfor, 1985) that rewards people for acquiring 
more skills than they might use at any one time.
Skill acquisition under these systems consists of several types: horizontal skills have 
ladders of increasing knowledge and skill associated with a person’s primary 
specialization; secondary skills can be support skills that contribute to the work group’s 
task in its area of responsibility; and administrative or vertical or coordinating skills are 
those associated with the day-to-day management of the team.
4.3.5 Minimal Critical Specifications and the Principle of Incompletion. No more 
design detail should be specified than is necessary so as not to constrain subsequent 
changes and to provide those involved in the design with "space" to take ownership for 
the aspects of the design they are to influence or affect.
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This principle is in direct contrast to a traditional engineering one that aims to specify 
every possible detail in advance (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992). Sociotechnical systems 
designs are never complete; they evolve as the environment changes and as members 
change as a result of multiskilling and team membership.
If sociotechnical organizations are learning systems, then freedom to incorporate 
learning must be allowed. Although the principle of minimal critical specifications would 
appear to ease the change process from a more authoritarian system towards a more 
participative one, it is not evident that it is helpful moving from a more autonomous 
organization to a more controlled one (Klein, 1991).
4.3.6 Support Congruence. The support systems of sociotechnical designs should be 
compatible with the design objectives of the different features of the design. For 
example, if people are to be granted local autonomy, they must be given the information 
and the authority to make local decisions. If equity and open communications is a 
desired attribute of the organization, then status differentials, which normally get in the 
way of achieving these ends, must be lowered. If work is organized by way of teams, 




This section has focused on the introduction of a new paradigm of work- 
sociotechnical systems design—that has changed and has the potential to change the 
"middle" of the organization where a particularly large amount of pressure is being 
exerted on the organizational and managerial systems. Sociotechnical systems, as 
alternative ways of organizing for PSTA, are solutions to the pressure on the middle. 
Sociotechnical systems designs focus explicitly on the vertical dimension of that pressure. 
They decentralize responsibility and delegate traditional middle management tasks to 
teams of people capable of self-regulating their activities (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
Commentators, particularly those approaching the subject from the technological side, 
have increasingly mentioned the necessity to pay attention to the sociotechnical 
dimension. For the most part, they mean the "people" aspect and usually refer to the 
issue in terms of resistance to change and implementation and sometimes recognize the 
importance of participation and involvement to obtain commitment. What they are less 
aware of, and what this section had tried to highlight, is that paying attention to the 
sociotechnical dimension means appreciating that a real revolution in the ways of working 









Rogers and Rogers (1976) defines communication as a process in which an idea is 
purposefully transferred from a source to a receptor to change its behavior. Such a 
behavior may include a change in knowledge, a change in attitude, or an observable 
change in behavior. Jackson (1959) tried a different approach when analyzing the 
driving forces directing communication: motivational forces. Kast and Rosenzweig 
(1988) were concerned with the role mutual understanding plays in the communication 
process. Drucker (1977) defined communication as the ability to organize and express 
ideas in writing and in speaking, and is concerned about how scarce this ability is in 
today’s managers. Aamodt (1991) considers the listening as a valuable communication 
skill.
Acts considered by such approaches are variations of the mathematical approach of 
Shannon and Weaver (1949), limited to message transmission, report execution, 
instruction transmission, among other acts, but have not considered language use as an 
expression of commitment or the role interpretation plays in the communication process. 
Aamodt slightly touched this last with his description about inflection changes and 
meaning, even though his example illustrating this point is exactly the same example 
Searle used in his illocutionary acts taxonomy {Expression and Meaning, 1979, p. 5).
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Watzlawick (1981) has developed a pragmatic communication theory. Two 
fundamental aspects of this theory are first, relationships between interlocutors are a 
meta-communication relative to the communicational content; this point can be illustrated 
by real cases—indeed lamentable ones—which become amusing in their irrationality. The 
following anecdote illustrates: two office clerks work with each other sitting one in front 
of the other; because of personal problems they do not talk each other. To coordinate 
their actions they require a third person. When this third person, the coordinator, is not 
around, they do not work with each other.
The second aspect has to do with punctuations of communication sequences; that is, 
who—according to the interlocutors—started a determined sequence. This aspect is clearly 
seen in the organization; in breakdown situations, different departments blame each other 
for making mistakes derived from inappropriate communication interpretations. Third, 
Watzlawick (1981) thinks organizations use rules, procedures, memos, and the like to 
prevent their member’s spontaneity, and for avoiding the danger of what is unexpected 
and uncodifiable. Luhmann (1983) considers social systems as communication systems 
in which communications are made in operational closure. Operational closure means 
that only communications can be a part of a system, and anything occurring outside its 
boundaries will be relevant for it if only if it is contained in a communication.
Maturana (1978) says that personality systems are autopoietic systems of thought 
(generate thoughts by means of thoughts and only what is thought can affect them). Both 
systems, personality and communication, are structurally coupled.
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As autopoietic systems, they hold constant their organization and define their boundaries 
through continuous production of their components; their very nature dictates their 
evolving in such a way that their activities are properly coupled to their medium.
Maturana (1970) uses the term "medium" instead of environment to avoid the 
connotation that there is a separation between an entity and its environment. An entity 
exists as part of a medium, not as a separate object inside it; that is, it is structurally 
coupled to its medium. Structural coupling is the basis for understanding that any change 
in one system will trigger a determined change in another system.
In a conversation, for example, each person has his own thoughts; what is said in the 
conversation will trigger different interpretations in others; what each of them thinks will 
trigger his own communication system so that the other can understand what he is trying 
to say. However, both know they have no adequate way for communicating their 
thoughts; neither knowing what each of them is thinking about. In this sense, not even 
the expression, I understand, is an understanding warranty; warranty in the sense that 
the hearer has understood what the speaker has wanted to say. This mutual process can 
lead to interlocked patterns of behavior that form a consensual domain (Maturana, 1978)
5.2 Communication and Language
The consensual domain is reducible neither to the physical domain nor to the domain 
of interactions, but is generated in the interplay through structural coupling as determined 
by the demands of autopoiesis of each participant.
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In this context, the physical domain refers to the structures of the organism that 
participates in it; the domain of interactions, on the other hand, refers to the history by 
which it came to be. Maturana (1978) refers to behavior in a consensual domain as 
linguistic behavior and, for him, human language is a consensual domain. A language 
exists among a community of individuals, and is continuously regenerated through 
linguistic activity and structural coupling generated by that activity.
Language properties of being arbitrary and contextual would be taken as defining 
features; in this sense, the property of being arbitrary is because it can have any form 
as long as it operates as triggering perturbations in the interactions, and the property of 
being contextual is because its participation in the interlocked interactions of the domain 
is defined only with respect to the interactions that constitute that domain. Language acts 
exist as language in the consensual domain generated by mutual interaction. Language, 
as a consensual domain, is a patterning of mutual orienting behavior. The basic function 
of language as a system of orienting behavior is not the transmission of information or 
the description of an independent universe about which people can talk, but the creation 
of a consensual domain of behavior between linguistically interacting systems through the 
development of a cooperative domain of interactions (Maturana, 1980).
Searle (1979) supports the existence of an "essential relationship" between language 
and communication, and between meaning and speech acts. There are, of course, 
divergent lines of thought, as that one of Chomsky (1975), but those questioning have 
failed to consistently defy it.
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5.3 Breakdown and Listening
Suppose you are preparing a presentation of a specific operational mining plan. 
Because top management will make decisions on the basis of your findings, you are 
considering supporting implications of the plan through well-organized slides; so you are 
sitting at your computer designing them; the software and all related computer equipment 
and materials are familiar to you; while you are typing, your hands are "transparents" 
and you automatically correct your typing mistakes. You are not thinking about what 
you are working with—the software—or about what you are looking at, as far as looking 
for something wrong.
When you want to print your slides in a shared-time laser-printer, you realize that 
something is rong; the printer is not executing your instructions. You know how touse 
a computer, but you are not an expert; so you need help to solve the problem. When 
you are told that the printer will be repaired in two days, you decide to call your boss 
to report the situation. Your boss answers that the meeting has been moved up to 
tomorrow and he needs you immediately to discuss your findings. He asks you to go to 
his office and print your slides there; moreover, he offers you his secretary’s assistance, 
if needed. When you drive your truck toward the boss’ office, you have already 
forgotten the printer problem; now your are thinking about how to face tomorrow’s 
meeting.
To analyze this example, the breakdown notion must be stressed; the term, however, 
has been previously used, and its meaning has remained implicit in the context.
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An aspect of Heidegger’s thought (Dreyfus, 1991; Searle, 1985; and, Winograd and 
Flores, 1986) that is difficult to assimilate is his view that objects and properties are not 
inherent in the world, but arise only in an event of breaking down in which they become 
present-at-hand. It is possible to see that for different people, engaged in different 
activities, the existence of objects and properties emerges in different kinds of breaking 
down.
In the example above, you were typing your slides; you thought of words and they 
appeared on your screen; there was a network of equipment that included your arms and 
hands, a keyboard, and many complex devices that mediate between you and the screen. 
Your problem brought forth a complex network of properties reflecting the design of the 
system and the details of computer software and hardware. For you, this network of 
objects and properties did not exist previously. The typing was part of your world, but 
not the structure that emerged as you tried to cope with the breakdown. But of course 
it did exist for someone else—for the people who created the device by a process of 
conscious design. They too, though, took for granted a background of equipment which, 
in the face of breaking down, they could have further brought to light.
Heidegger (1962) insists that it is meaningless to talk about the existence of objects 
and properties in the absence of purposeful activity, with its potential for breaking down. 
What really is is not defined by an objective all-knowing observer, nor is it defined by 
an individual—the writer or computer designer—but rather by a potential space of human 
concern and action (Winograd and Flores, 1986).
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The breakdown reveals our immediate situation—how well we are prepared—to face 
it and, with it, our future commitments appear. These commitments can be as those 
defined as commissives: your promise of presenting your operational plan in tomorrow’s 
meeting, for instance. They also can be those implicit commitments relating to what you 
must do to finish your work satisfactorily. What is certain is that in the breakdown 
situation, you were conscious of (you listened to) your past commitments, be they 
implicitly or explicitly assumed for you.
Your conversation with your supervisor illustrates an important point about the nature 
of supervision. Your supervisor responded immediately and offered you both secretarial 
services and equipment to finish the presentation. He did not have to evaluate all 
alternatives, even though his decision involved reorganizing the office. To be a 
supervisor is to be capable of facing breakdowns. But where does this capacity come 
from? It comes from two sources. The first is called understanding: that skill to 
anticipate in such a way that allows one to immediately see what is possible to do. The 
second is called animus state: that particular way we have to stand by ourselves in the 
world, that something which is created by our presence. Animus state and understanding 
are the two dimensions beyond interpretative listening (Flores, 1982). This can, however, 
sound like metaphor. The concept can be better understood through examples.
Suppose that a neighbor calls you to say there is fire at your home; you are scared 
and do not know what to do. You call your supervisor. You would like to give him an 
excuse for not completing your work, but that sounds trivial.
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Your supervisor knows how to answer; he tells you he can get along without your report; 
he knows what a supervisor must be; that means he must help you and relieve you of 
your immediate job obligations, regardless of how important it can be for him. What 
kind of understanding is this?
In the same way, when you experience a normal breakdown, your understanding of 
what an employee must be tells you should communicate his problem to your supervisor; 
you cannot excuse yourself by saying that nobody explicitly tells you to do it. 
Understanding rests in this background of possibilities; in this background of alternative 
courses of action and routines.
These possibilities are your interpretation. This interpretation, however, is not 
something separable from you. It is not something you can contemplate. Interpretation 
is listening while things are occurring and responding to the question, "what needs to be 
done?"
These possibilities are not logical alternatives an analyst can describe. There could 
be an infinite number of logical possibilities, but that is not what here is termed 
"possibilities." Possibilities, as understood, are created within a real situation and they 
will constitute your field of action (or position). For understanding to make sense, it 
must have some real possibilities that can be picked up from a wider spectrum. An 
American firm can fire an employee for failing to meet his organizational commitment; 
that is a possibility. A Japanese firm cannot fire an employee, nor can a Japanese 
employee move to another firm; that is not a possibility.
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The animus state, on the other hand, can be illustrated by an example from 
professional sports. Players must not only understand the game strategies, they must 
commit themselves to evoke and design a consistent animus state to success in 
accomplishing their mission: winning the game.
The firm is, of course, a team, and that which is valid for a sports team is also valid 
for the firm. Animus state keys for a powerful team are ambition, acceptance, serenity, 
respect, belonging sense, pride, friendship, and honor. Obviously, this does not mean 
that "negative" animus states—those closing future possibilities—will not be generated; 
negatives animus states can occur in anyone, and that includes the manager.
In these cases, the commitment is related, first, to observing negatives animus states- 
-resignation, resentment, arrogance, anger—as automatic judgments and not as "realities": 
and, second, to intervene in them to change negative evaluations of possibilities. These 
interventions will be effective, first, as evidence that negative animus states have been 
detected and, second, as an invitation to generate positive ones or to fight with the 
underlying reason of the negative ones.
The objective of an intervention is to start a speculation and new action conversation 
allowing for a change to the animus state (Flores, 1989). This commitment also includes 
the design; that is, anticipating and generating the necessary animus state for success. 
The manager is "the guardian" of his team’s animus state (in fact, this is a domain in 
which the manager cannot allow himself the luxury of being less than competent).
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The manager can refer to his team’s animus state in scheduled meetings, but before any 
doubt that prevents to comply with commitments the manager will not hesitate to refer 
to them at any time. Further, if a manager realizes he does not have the necessary 
competence to deal with the situation, he will no doubt ask for help from those with 
proven competence.
Dreyfus (1991) distinguishes three kinds of breakdown: first, when equipment 
malfunctions; in the example above, this occurred when the Laser-printer did not work. 
Second, when something is missing; in the example, the supervisor had to apportion a 
set of replacements. The third case is the total breakdown; when something prevents us 
from relating successfully to our surroundings. This typology of breakdown is useful, 
but it is most important to recall the deepest unity of breakdown phenomena: what is 
malfunctioning, what is missing or what is obstructing is, in the end, our successful 
relationships with the world. Here is where the role of design becomes apparent. An 
organization attempts to exploit potential breakdowns by division of labor, in order to be 
ready to deal with breakdowns as something already known.
So far, consideration has been given to one type of breakdown. It is also possible 
to extend this consideration to the human dimension of the conflict. In language, the 
correspondence of words to the non-linguistic medium is equally indirect. Human 
activities use language, and their use of linguistic forms is shaped by the need for 
effective coordination of action with others (Maturana, 1980; Searle 1985 ; Winograd and 
Flores, 1986).
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If one person’s utterance is not intelligible to others, or if its interpretation by the 
listener is not consistent with the actions the speaker anticipates, there will be a 
breakdown. If, for example, the production cost of your area was 65C/unit instead of 
the 50C/unit you had promised, your boss may decide that "he cannot take you 
seriously."
Indeed, your failure will prevent him from complying with his own commitments. 
A fundamental condition of successful communication is lost unless you give satisfactory 
explanations so that your boss believes what you say. From here on, all that is required 
is that there be a sufficient coupling so that breakdowns are infrequent, and a standing 
commitment by both speaker and listener to enter into a dialogue in the face of a 
breakdown.
The conditions of appropriateness for commitment naturally take into account the role 
of a shared unarticulated background. When a person promises to do something, it goes 
without saying that the commitment is relative to unstated assumptions. If your boss asks 
you to come to a meeting tomorrow and you respond, 'T il be there," you are 
performing a commissive speech act. By virtue of the utterance, you create a 
commitment. If you find out tomorrow that the meeting was moved to Chuquicamata 
and you do not show up, you can justifiably argue that you have not broken your 
promise. What you really meant was, "Assuming it is held at the time and location 
scheduled."
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On the other hand, if the meeting is moved to an adjacent room, and you know it but do 
not show up, your boss is justified in arguing that you have broken your promise, and 
that the "Chuquicamata excuse1 does not apply.
If the meaning of a speech act is created by listening within a background, how can 
the speaker be responsible for a commitment to its consequences? Participants in a 
shared tradition are each responsible for the consequences of how their acts will be 
understood within that tradition. The fact that there are no objective rules and that there 
may be at times disagreements does not free them of that responsibility.
Communication in the organization is essentially seen as two-way commitments, and 
its bridge is the shared intentionality; the concept, as illustrated in the example, 
pressuposes that some understanding has already been achieved at a prior level. The 
manager’s communication problem must not be solved from unilateral perspective--as in 
the metaphor, "going to lunch with the guys"-but as a mutual responsibility.
But, in what context could a person believe he/she is taking advantage of these 
concepts? The following example can answer this question.
Suppose that a customer enters a shop to buy a suit. A smart salesman can 
determine after a few minutes of conversation what kind of antecedents that person has 
and what his future expectations could be. Suppose that in this case, the salesman finds 
out that his customer is a young professional who is starting a career as executive 
consultant. The salesman may assumes that his customer has to observe a certain dress 
code. The salesman can then suggest suits appropriate to the assumed code.
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In listening to customer’s interests instead of his necessities, the salesman acts as an 
ally. The salesman helps the customer to develop an appropriate image for his career 
and, in turn, creates possibilities for himself. In the same way, a manager, or any 
organizational actor, could ask himself, "Who is my main customer?" "What kind of 
role does he play in the organization?" "What are his commitments?" "What could his 
breakdowns be?" "What kind of contributor am I?"
5.4 Thrownness
One of the most fundamental aspects of Heidegger’s discourse (Heidegger, 1962) is 
his emphasis on the state of thrownness as a condition of being-in-the-world. People at 
times engage in conscious reflection and systematic thought, but these are secondary to 
the pre-reflective experience of being thrown into a situation in which they are already 
acting.
Winograd and Flores (1986) use a simple example:
Suppose that you are chairing a meeting for 15 people, in which a controversial issue 
is to be decided—whether to bring a new computer system into the organization, for 
instance. As the meeting goes on, you must keep things going in a productive direction, 
deciding on whom to call, when to cut a speaker off, when to an end the discussion, call 
for a vote, and so forth. Differences of opinion are forcefully expressed, and if you do 
not take a strong role, the discussion will quickly deteriorate into a shouting match with 
the loudest repeating their own fixed positions in hopes of wearing everyone else down.
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A number of observations can be made about your situation:
5.4.1 You Cannot Avoid Acting. At every moment, you are in a position of authority, 
and your actions affect the situation. If you just sit there, that in itself constitutes an 
action, with effects that you may or may not want. You are "thrown" into action 
independent of your will. You cannot step back and reflect on your actions. Anyone 
who has been in this kind of situation has afterwards felt "I should have said..." or "I 
should not have let Joe get away with. In the need to respond immediately to what 
people say and do, it is impossible to take time to analyze explicitly and choose a course 
of action. In fact, if you stop to do so you will miss something of what is going on, and 
implicitly choose to let it go on without interruption. You are thrown on what people 
loosely call your "instincts," dealing with whatever comes up.
5.4.2 The Effects of Actions Cannot Be Predicted. Even if you have time to reflect, 
it is impossible to know how your actions will affect others. If you decide to cut 
someone off in order to get to another topic, the group may object to your heavy- 
handedness, that in itself becoming a topic of discussion. If you avoid calling on 
someone whose opinion you do not like, you may find that he shouts it out, or that a 
friend feels compelled to take up his viewpoint. Of course this does not imply that there 
is total chaos, but simply that you cannot count on careful, rational planning to find 
steps that will achieve your goals. You must, as the idiom goes, "flow with the 
situation."
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5.4.3 You Do Not Have a Stable Representation of the Situation. In the post-mortem 
analysis, you will observe that there were significant patterns. "There were two factions, 
with the Smith group trying to oppose the computer by keeping the discussion on costs 
and away from the analysis, and the Wilson group trying to be sure that whether or not 
we got the computer, they would remain in control of the scheduling policies. Evans 
was the key, since he could go either way, and they brought up the training issue because 
that is his bailiwick and they knew he would not want extra headaches." In a sense you 
have a representation of the situation, with objects—the two factions—and properties—their 
goals, Evans’ lack of prior loyalty, etc.—but this was not the understanding you had to 
work with as it was developing. Pieces of it may have emerged as the meeting went on, 
but they were fragmentary, possibly contradictory, and may have been rejected for others 
as the fray continued.
5.4.4 Every Representation Is an Interpretation. Even in the post-mortem, your 
description of what was going on is hardly an objective analysis of the kind that could 
be subjected to proof. Two people at the same meeting could well come away with very 
different interpretations. Evans might say, "Smith is competing with me for that 
promotion, and he wanted to bring up the training issue to point out that we have been 
difficulty in our group lately." There is no ultimate way to determine whether any one 
interpretation is really right or wrong, and even the people whose behavior is in question 
may well not be in touch with their own motivations.
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5.4.5 Language Is Action. Each time you speak, you are doing something quite 
different from simply "stating a fact." If you say, "First we have to address the issue 
of system development" or "Let us someone on the other side talk," you are not 
describing the situation, but creating it. The existence of "the issue of system 
development" or "the other side" is an interpretation, and in mentioning it you bring your 
interpretation into the group discourse. Of course others can object: "That is not really 
an issue. You are confusing two things" or "We are not taking sides. Everyone has his 
own opinion." But whether or not your characterization is taken for granted or taken as 
the basis for argument, you have created the objects and properties it describes by virtue 
of making the utterance (Winograd and Flores, 1986, p. 34).
Heidegger (1962) recognized that ordinary everyday life is like the situation just 
described. Interactions between people and those between people and the inanimate 
world they inhabit put them into a situation of thrownness, for which the metaphor of the 
meeting is much more apt than the metaphor of the objective, detached scientist who 
makes observations, forms hypotheses, and consciously chooses a rational course of 
action. However, even though a person’s performance in this meeting could not be the 
result of consideration but as a way of being, indeed his experience and previous 
information (about how helpful the new computer system may be for the organization) 
may be much more important than any other consideration. Our claim is that experience 
and information are key determinants to this thrownness condition.
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Certainly, there are structured and unstructured tasks. Nearly every writer on 
management and decision making draws a dichotomy between two kinds of managerial 
situations: "programmed vs. nonprogrammed decisions" (Simon, The Shape o f 
Automation fo r  Men and Management, 1965), "structured vs. unstructured problems" 
(Keen and Scott-Morton, 1978), "established vs. emergent situations" (Boguslaw, The 
New Utopians, 1965). On the one hand there are obviously recurrent tasks, such as the 
scheduling of jobs on the machines in a productive system. On the other, there are open- 
ended innovative actions introduced in conversations for possibilities.
For structured tasks it is often possible to create a set of rules and have computers 
apply them to the situation. For unstructured tasks such rules cannot be formulated. 
There is, however, an in-between area of "semi-structured" tasks with some degree of 
recurrence but not so much that one can fully specify the relevant rules. Keen and Scott 
(1978) see this as the relevant area for computer aid to human decision making. They 
state their goals not as "efficiency" but "effectiveness" (measured in terms of global 
outcomes rather than of the speed of making decisions or their immediate payoffs). A 
system is effective if an organization using it finds itself in a better position. A system 
can be ineffective but be highly efficient at making decisions that are in fact irrelevant 
or harmful to the enterprise.
T-4099 81
5.5 Organizations as Networks of Commitments
Careful observers of what succesful managers do (Mintzberg, for instance, in The 
Nature o f Managerial Work, 1973) have remarked that managerial activities are not well 
represented by the stereotype of a reflecting, solitary mind studying complex alternatives. 
Instead, managers appear to be absorbed in many short interactions, most of them lasting 
between two and twenty minutes (Winograd and Flores, 1986).
They manifest a great preference for oral communication—by telephone or face to 
face (Stewart, 1982; Cooke and Slack, 1984). It may be said that managers engage in 
conversations in which they create, take care of, and initiate new commitments within 
an organization, that is, generating and coordinating action.
Bullet and Bennet (1983) pointed out that the work managers perform is based on 
person-to-person communications. The steps in obtaining results via this type of 
communication are the following: (1) make requests and receive promises for action;
(2) discuss and negotiate, to make clear the assignment and the responsibility for results;
(3) follow up on progress toward, and barriers in the way of, obtaining the desired 
results; (4) redirect the assignment when necessary and renew commitments, or 
acknowledge failure of the assignment, (5) receive (or deliver) results, and (6) 
acknowledge completion of the assignment. Flores and Bell (1984) say that managers 
are paid to discover what is missing in the work that is already going forward and to 
bring that into being.
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Data and information help managers discover what is missing, but human 
communications are needed to bring the missing work into being.
It may be said, then, that managers engage in conversations in which they create, 
take care of, and initiate new commitments within an organization. In understanding 
management as the of articulation and activation of a network of commitments, produced 
primarily through promises and requests, it is possible to cover many managerial 
activities. Nevertheless, it is also needed to incorporate the most essential responsibilities 
of managers: to be open, to listen, and to be the authority regarding what activities and 
commitments the network will deal with (Winograd and Flores, 1986). These can be 
characterized as participation in "conversations for possibilities" that open new 
perspectives for the conversations for actions.
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Chapter 6
SECOND STRATEGY: IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL CONVERSATIONS
6.1 The Manager’s Interactions
Communication channels provided by the structure of the organization should be 
necessary and sufficient to generate and coordinate action. The manager’s problem in 
this domain may come from inadequate organizational design; the manager’s ability to 
activate the relevant channels as well as his ability to interact through them account for 
inefficiencies. Conversations constitute the base of the manager’s interactions; their 
relevance becomes more apparent when a manager is dealing with unstructured situations. 
In structured situations, objectives are clear, implying strong organizational agreements 
about what to do.
If the manager always has clear situational objectives, then his problem may be 
reduced to comparing objectives with outcomes. If there are variances, he should 
proceed to change the relevant parameters so that the organization achieves its objectives. 
This is a simple learning mechanism, and there is usually no need for the manager to 
know every intricacy of the situation. Most of the implications of the objectives would 
be absorbed by the discretion and/or autonomy of lower structural levels. Both the 
manager and the other organizational actors would clarify the dimensions of control, thus 
giving a clear focus to information processes. Unfortunately, in actual managerial 
situations, as will be shown in the case study, this is not always the case.
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The nature of the managerial activity is deciding what to do in the absence of clear 
objectives. It is only through conversations that managers can establish the relative 
validity of a range of possible viewpoints; the outcome of conversations is a degree of 
agreement, which implicity or explicitly, is defining a reference for his action. This 
sounds easy but it is not so; complex deliberation processes can take place before 
reaching a consensus about possible courses of action to be evaluated and considered.
There is, as a result, an intimate connection between the strategy of structural 
adjustments and that of the design of organizational conversations. Espejo and Watt 
(1988) say that organizational conversations are the fine mesh of the network called 
organizational structure. From the viewpoint of attenuation, managers are constantly 
engaged in conversations, both inside and outside their organizations. These 
conversations define the local environment of the manager. While distant information 
is essentially a summary of specific outcomes elsewhere, deemed to be relevant to the 
manager, local information is richer in content, more subtle, multidimensional (Espejo 
and Watt, 1988); it relates to the immediate processes impinging on the manager. It is 
with (by necessity, ocasional) local information of distant processes that a manager can, 
among other things, work out a meaning for distant information. Here is the attenuation 
process which permits the separation of the less from the more relevant, the trivial issue 
from the strategic. For the manager, the outcomes of these conversations are the 
structuring of both his own activities—with reference to his perceptions of personal and 
organizational stability—and also the organizational tasks.
T-4099 85
Indeed, different organizational conversations may lead to very different outcomes- 
hence the relevance about thinking of them purposefully. Espejo and Watt (1988) see 
here a circular situation in which the purposes of the manager define the conversations 
of his interest at the same time that these very conversations help to define his purposes. 
However circular this argument might be, it is precisely this definition of relevant 
conversations which permits the manager to manage his local information. At this point 
it should be apparent how this strategy is intertwined with the first one: different 
organizational structures will facilitate or inhibit different conversations.
So much for the attenuation process. According to the model developed in this 
thesis, a matching amplification process is needed. Since the above argument is 
symmetrical, then it must be the case that each manager is constantly involved in the task 
of coordinating his action and the actions of others; this coordination must imply 
commitments of the "world-to-word" kind. The manager’s success in exchanging 
commitments for action, through the conversational process, will define the level of 
amplification achieved in this strategy.
It is from the nature of the organization’s evolved norms for interpersonal 
interactions that commitments get most of their meaning—and result in organizational 
action. Breakdowns in these commitments are inevitable. They are forced by their poor 
fit with the world, by poor organizational communications—structure—or by sheer lack 
of common understanding. However, the more frequent these breakdowns are, the larger 
are the manager’s information needs.
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A strategy for information management in this direction would aim at making 
interpersonal interactions more effective by offering ways of increasing the chance of 
meaningful commitments, increasing the chances of coordinated action and increasing the 
chances of learning from the inevitable breakdowns. In fact, perceiving "too many" 
breakdowns would be a symptom indicating the need for this strategy.
In all, it can be said that although unhibited communications are essential for 
effective attenuation of task complexity, commitments—for action—are essential for 
effective amplification of managerial action.
6.2 The Planning Process
The planning process, in this thesis’s interpretation, consists of producing a narrative 
about a future in which people commit themselves to accomplish conditions of 
satisfaction which have been previously declared. An example illustrates how this 
concept is applied to the firm.
Codelco’s president announced that Codelco’s development strategy for the ’90s 
should emphasize recovering its competitive position which had been eroded over the 
course of the past ten years, and seek to maintain and strengthen its leadership in the 
copper industry (Presentation at the International Seminar on Competitiveness in the 
Copper Industry: Present and Future; Cesco, Santiago, Chile, December 1990).
Four aspects can be extracted from this declaration. First, a mission is established 
by someone who has the power to do so.
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This declaration will be a reality if, as a result of the actions realized by Codelco, 
pertinent communities for Codelco evoke this evaluation in the same terms as declared. 
These pertinent communities are the market, competitors, and top managers. This kind 
of mission is a strategic mission. The strategic mission aims to open a space of 
possibilities for a more specific network of declarations that will be called operational 
missions; these include standards and conversations to action; both will generate 
consistent actions with the fundamental evaluation that is needed for the mission, and 
both are declarations about those evaluations which will be produced as a result of the 
actions realized by the respective teams’ members. This point is fundamental in order 
to realize the planning process.
Second, this declaration is, at the same time, providing an observer of the actions in 
the organization. In not being the mission, it is not possible to know how well the 
organization is doing, including whether progress is being made, whether people are 
learning, and whether the organization is lossing or winning.
Third, the mission activates people’s evaluation about which action fields are available 
to them, what kind of requests and promises are required, what possibilities of design are 
feasible, and what standards will be established consistent with accomplishing the 
mission.
Fourth, to declare the mission is also to constitute the community that will struggle 
to accomplish it.
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Those who do not commit to accomplisment put themselves out of this community; that 
is, out of the team and the firm.
More important, however, in order to declare a mission within an organization, 
something more is needed than simply making a declarative utterance. The conversation 
of the mission is open to those who have the power to signal the direction the 
organization must follow. This organization can be a firm, a division, a team, or a 
project, and the declaration will be judged to be weak or strong one according to how 
consistent and coherent the actions to accomplish the mission are.
In evaluating consistency, the team will evaluate the logic within the set of individual 
promises established in the plan; there must be no contradiction between the team’s 
promises, which means that they will be complied with in the anticipated order. In 
evaluating coherency, the team will evaluate whether the promises established in the plan 
aim at the same target: to achieve the mission. Both consistency and coherency will 
show a gap when (1) a promise is broken; (2) an unanticipated failure appears; (3) the 
customer evaluates that the work does not correspond with the agreed standard; (4) new 
possibilities arise; and (5) the mission is changed. In all these situations, it is necessary 
to rebuild the plan.
The manager will determine when the first narrative to accomplish the mission has 
to be finished. His commitment consists of generating a history with foundations that
(1) his team shares, (2) includes the operational mission previously declared, (3) 
anticipates what failures can occur and what actions to correct them can be realized,
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(4) includes deadlines and persons who are responsible for promised actions; and (5) 
includes those opportunities in which the general achievement of the mission will be 
evaluated, such as meetings.
Flores (1989) says that a fundamental aspect in the planning process is conversations. 
With a background, a common experience, and standard practices, these planning 
conversations can be tremendously efficient. He distinguishes four parts to this process 
of conversations: speculations, tentative suggestions, formulating actions, and 
conversations for action. If a team follows a routine for planning, it can inhibit its 
potential for innovation but, in designing and developing competence in these kinds of 
conversations, the team can organize work through continuous conversation about design, 
with permanent possibilities to innovate.
This first narrative about the plan finishes when the manager and his team agree that 
they have a coherent and consistent history which will allow them to accomplish their 
mission. It includes working fields for each member of the team, common standards by 
which to evaluate their performances and personal commitments relative to both the plan 
and the mission.
The fact of finishing this first narrative does not prevent the team from continuing 
the planning process while it works to accomplish the mission. On the contrary, this is 
the first of several which will allow the team to successfully achieve its mission.
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6.3 The Animus State of Being in Charge
Constituting and leading teams are essential activities for successful managers. The 
great number of related courses, seminars, and symposiums shows the importance that 
the managerial community assigns teams. Further, the current demand for team training 
shows that the true competence to lead teams is quite uncommon and an accepted way 
to teach leadership still does not exist.
A key element between the strategic mission and operational missions is the 
coordination role. An example to illustrate this fact is a tale that F, C- Crawford--who 
retired in 1958 as President of the Thompson Ramo-Wooldridge—told his employees (as 
told by Dyer, Harvard Business Review).
It is an old tale he called "Little Willie’s Tale." Little Willie was a kid who wore 
short pants and the only thing he dreams of is to wear long pants like a big boy. 
Christmas time is coming and Willie asks Santa Claus for his long pants. His mother 
buys him long pants, but they are too long and she does not have time to fit them. Ella, 
Willie’s sister, and his grandmother, make a gift of them and put the package under the 
Christmas tree. His mother turns the light off, goes to bed and thinks, "Poor Little 
Willie will be really disappointed that he will not wear his long pants on Christmas day." 
About midnight she gets up, goes downstairs, turns the light on, cuts the pants down, 
sews a new long, and goes back to sleep. About 1 a.m ., his grandmother does the same. 
About 2 a.m., Ella does exactly the same. The next morning, Little Willie tries on his 
new pants and, of course, they are shorter than the old ones.
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The lesson is that well-meaning efforts do not guarantee a success by themselves. 
It is clear that conversations for action in the preceding example could have changed the 
sense of the tale. Conventional wisdom says that a team is a group of individuals 
interacting to reach a particular objective. This definition, however, does not permit 
generating competencies to constitute and lead teams because it fails in its way of 
considering how teams constitute and sustain themselves.
Flores (1989) talks about three aspects characterizing a team: (1) teams are formed 
when a group of people commit to the mission declared by the leader; (2) a team is a set 
of recurrent conversations between people committed to sharing the mission declared by 
the leader and coordinating actions aimed to achieve such a mission; and (3) leadership 
is a conversational phenomenon and not an essential quality of the individual; it occurs 
in a team’s conversations. In these conversations, the leader is the one who realizes 
actions which guarantee these conversations occur and, moreover, to assure that his team 
evaluates them as effective. The leader is the person who is validated by the team as the 
one in charge of the continuity of these conversations. In all teams, sooner or later, a 
leader appears, and it does not occur because someone proposes himself to be the leader, 
but because leadership arises by the need of coordinating actions coherently. The 
manager’s authority is given by the institution in which he participates; the leader’s 
authority is given by the community which needs be led. When the manager is granted 
the leader’s authority he must play the role conversation designer and practices in such 
a way that the team’s conversations are always accommodated.
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It is neither intended that the manager be "the best" for the team’s job, nor that he 
always have all the answers and solutions to all kinds of breakdowns. There are few 
symphony orchestra directors who know how to play the clarinet or the violin. Each 
director, however, is able to extract the best of each performer and achieve a complete 
harmonious work around a musical piece. This analogy demonstrates that it is not 
enough to put people together and call them a team. A group of experts do not constitute 
a team unless they have team conversations. These team conversations generate 
coordinated actions and the commitment to maintain a community striving for a common 
mission.
Flores (1989) says that leadership is the phenomenon of caring that this community 
realizes these conversations. A leader assumes responsibility in the following domains 
of commitment:
(1) The commitment of coordinating actions to accomplish the common strategic 
mission. Sharing a strategic mission and coordinating actions to accomplish it are 
what distinguishes a team from a group of people striving for a common purpose. 
The team’s possibilities are generated when the mission is declared; it is this 
declaration which joins people as soon as they committ to share the action.
(2) The commitment of taking ownership for the mission. In doing so, the manager 
makes evaluations about concerns, breakdowns, and opportunities to ensure that the 
team complies with the mission. This means that he must manage his own promises 
and, if he cannot comply with them, ask for competent help.
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(3) The commitment of complying with his role in the team work division. The team 
work will be divided into domains. Each member of the team has his/her own 
identity depending on the domain in which he/she commits to be in charge.
When a member of the team assumes the responsibility of a particular domain he will 
ensure that (a) actions realized in that domain are a function of accomplishing the 
mission; (b) actions realized in other domains are consistent with actions realized 
in his domain; (c) actions to be realized in his domain are consistent with actions 
realized in other domains.
The management tradition has used the term "work division" for this concept; but 
more than a division of work, it is a division of responsibilities in the sense that all 
members of the team are responsible for the success of the team mission.
(4) The commitment of developing and implementing practices of anticipation. 
Planning, innovating, and learning practices are included in this domain.
(5) The commitment to the unity of the team’s command and the policy declaration of 
the team. A policy declaration refers to conversations a community is concerned 
with, when these conversations are going to be realized, who the observers are, and 
who will not be included in these conversations. Note that the team members are 
committed to the manager as the political authority of the team, which includes the 
commitment to execute actions (this commitment is related to the manager’s role; 
people will commit to the person who plays this role).
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(6) The commitment of evoking and generating confidence. Luhmann (1983) says that 
confidence is a bet on the future which is based on a past behavior; of course, 
conversations for actions, require conditions of a minimum of sincerity.
(7) The commitment of an animus state of appropriation for a successful mission. As 
mentioned, these animus states are ambition, acceptance, serenity, respect, the sense 
of belonging, pride, friendship, and honor. The team members have to commit to 
evoke these animus states.
(8) The commitment to the future of the firm, the team, and the people. A successful 
team counts on the commitments of each of its members beyond the date in which 
a particular job finishes. Teams do not survive when their members act as 
mercenaries, by maintaining a commitment only to a particular task. Team members
must melt their personal identity into the team identity and develop an interest in the 
viability of the team.
(9) The commitment to the evaluation standards of the team. It includes the 
commitment to the standards for evaluating performance, both in the team domain 
and within the specific project which is being realized. It is not enough to 
distinguish the domains of the team conversations. Each team must declare the 
standards by which its performance evaluation will be conducted and learned in these
domains, and its members must commit to share the same standards; for example, 
standards to declare a task as finished need to be previously declared and members 
of the team must commit to share these standards.
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The manager invites each member of the team to participate in the conversations to 
declare standards for the team. When all agree, the manager makes a declaration 
and asks for the commitment of each member of the team to these standards. Once 
the declaration is made only the manager has the authority to change a standard (and 
when this occurs a new declaration is made). Of course each member of the team 









The Anglo-American sense of the word "management" differs from other 
management traditions, such as "gestion" in France and some Hispanic countries, even 
though a common concern is the operation of business. Anyone in a position to generate 
and coordinate actions in an organization is in some way a manager. In this sense, 
action does not refer exclusively to movements of the human body or those actions 
derived from the certain possibility of moving the human body—such as it could have 
been understood, for instance, by Taylor (1911).
Here, the meaning includes other implications. For example, consider the following 
situation: You are sitting at your computer, typing a chapter in your thesis, when your 
phone rings. The person on the other end is one of your friends. "What are you 
doing?" asks your friend, and you respond, "Well, I ’m very busy writing my thesis." 
When the conversation ends, you continue your work and the phone rings again. This 
time it is your advisor. "What are you doing?" he asks, and you answer, "I’m 
interpreting the coordinating and control problems in the mining firm. As I work with 
these problems and their effects the methods of reduction become clearer to me." After 
talking to your advisor, you return to work.
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After a while, your wife enters and tells you, "Sorry, I ’m late, but there was a traffic 
accident on the highway and I couldn’t call you; I hope you are not angry." You 
answer, "It’s Okay. I was waiting for you, but I did begin to worry."
In all these cases, you were occupied with your thesis, but each time somebody 
called and asked what you were doing, you gave a different answer. Answering the 
question, "what are you doing?" differs depending on who you are talking with. 
Although the answers are different, they are true in every case. The differences occur 
because the question is nonspecific. Moreover, if your mother called, most likely your 
answer would be entirely different; nonetheless, it would be as true as the other answers. 
A person’s actions go beyond the limits of what he/she can affirm he/she is doing.
An action, then, is conceived as an act fundamentally linguistic (Flores, 1982). In 
this study, as a consequence, the term management conveys the sense of active concern 
with action, and especially with the securing of effective cooperative action. At a higher 
level, management is also concerned with the generation of contexts in which effective 
action can be consistently realized.
This does not mean, however, that the rich management tradition is not being 
considered. Any practical reflection must take this tradition into account. Rarely in 
human history has an institution appeared to be consolidated so rapidly and concretely 
as has management. Few managers realize the tremendous impact that management has 
had. This may explain why they are not adequately prepared to face the changes which 
are taking place in firms. Problems which are truly important to managers are coming 
from neither technological nor political fields.
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The problems have originated inside the firm, so that the fundamental mission of 
managers continues to be the same. This mission is to get both cooperative and effective 
action of people toward achievement of objectives and common values, procure an 
appropriate structure, and provide personnel with the necessary training and development 
to improve both effectiveness and adaptation to changes (Fletcher, personal interview, 
February 23 1993).
Another tradition, however, must be taken into account: the bureaucratic management 
tradition as seen in the military, the church, and in governments. It is still present in 
modem society through legal and administrative procedures. Its characteristic is that 
events are treated as repetitive instances coming from previously interpreted cases which 
will be solved in similar forms.
Finally, three additional discourses about management tradition must be considered: 
the first is related to the technical problem of optimizing decision-making process; the 
second is related to the enrichment of both organization and action quality explanations; 
the third discourse is directly derived from the concrete practice of facing organizational 
and efficiency problems. This approach could be extrapolated to apply to different 
cultural contexts. Interpretation, however, plays a key role. Ohno (1988) describes a 
fundamental interpretative difference between Japanese and U.S managers: management 
practices, such as inventory and quality control, were interpreted in different ways by 
Japanese and U.S. managers. Maturana (1974) thinks that cultural differences do not 




In 1946, ENIAC, the first computer, was put on line. Since then, information has 
been one of the main principles by which to organize work. Based on Maturana’s 
findings, Espejo (1983a) concludes that information is a concept closely related to the 
artificial nature of social systems and not an intrinsic property of natural systems.
Natural systems are the result of a long-term, evolutionary process in which higher 
levels of complexity are achieved by self-organization. Their stability is the result of 
intrinsic regulatory mechanisms, and their behavior is the outcome of accommodating to 
medium disturbances. The organization of a natural system—that is, an organism- 
involves absorbing these disturbances by itself, which is a property that defines the unity 
and autonomy of that system.
In all the related processes, there is no information transferred, but just a continuous 
adaptation to the medium disturbances. No doubt, multiple transactions take place among 
the organizational parts in this process adaptation, but they occur in a chain in which the 
parts exhibit organizational closure. The parts do not need to receive a message that a 
change is taking place somewhere else in order to proceed with their own adaptation; 
because of their structural coupling nature they just change as the other parts change. 
Hence the notion of information is not relevant in the domain of the autonomy of a 
natural system (Maturana and Varela, 1980). It may be relevant to an observer who is 
trying to explain some aspects of properties of the system under his observation. For 
him, however, the concept of information is relevant only for descriptive purposes.
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What is unique to social systems is that their parts are self-aware and have their own 
intentions (Chekland, 1980). This implies that their adaptation mechanisms are not only 
the result of self-organization, but also from design purposes. Espejo (1983a) found that 
this dimension of extrinsic control relates to the concept of management. Managers’ 
organizational purposes define the transactions which are potentially of informational 
value. A large number of transactions do not reach management since they are 
controlled within the organization; that is, they remain within the domain of autonomy 
of the organization and do not have an information value for management; they are 
informationless. But the fact that transactions exist which are not reaching management 
does not necessarily imply that they are informationless; there may be transactions that 
are informational for which there is no control capacity within the organization. This, 
however, is not common; most managers often perceive an information overload.
In general, information impinges upon them from three sources. These sources are: 
the organizational structure, their personal interactions, and the information systems. 
Information is closely intertwined with action, and is defined as that which reduces a 
manager’s uncertainty about relevant situations in the world (Espejo and Watt, 1988). 
But if information is that which reduces uncertainty, then what is it that triggers 
divergence and disorder and yet is not perceived as noise? Of course, that too, 
potentially, is information, albeit for as yet unstructured situations. Very often, the 
manager does not get his information in clearly defined packages relevant to his range 
of tasks and sequenced appropriately.
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The information impinges upon the manager in multiple ways with false alarms, 
absence of real alarms, corrupted by "noise", too early, too late--and always too much, 
unless he decides to manage his information. Indeed, the paradox for managers is that 
while most of the time they perceive an information overload, seldom do they perceive 
that they have enough information to take optimal decisions. Espejo and Watt (1988) 
consider that this paradox can be explained by the open-ended and shifting nature of 
managerial situations as mentioned earlier; the overload is likely to emerge because 
managers need to structure hazy, ill-defined situations.
If something happens or is done in the organization then a fact has occurred; a 
situational fact will be called an event; when an event is stored in a record, it becomes 
a datum; data are statements o f events. In any social situation the wealth of events is so 
large that no person can expect to be in touch with all of them; in fact, there will be 
more data available to the manager than information. Data will become information as 
the result of aggregation and the representation of processes; in other words, filtering 
process. Limited, human information-processing capacity suggests that an individual can 
cope only with aggregations and a few facts. If a manager’s purpose is to control a 
given situation, then he cannot rely only on chance to bring the desired facts and 
aggregations to his attention. This is precisely the problem of information management. 
The bridge-linking tasks and managers form the organization structure which, therefore, 
requires an adequate design for an effective filtering of events.
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This filtering process implies the necessity of autonomy within the organization; that 
is, components of the organization should have the ability from within to give closure to 
information loops, with no reference to the superior managerial level. However, since 
the organization is operating within the guidelines—criteria of performance, for instance- 
of purposeful managers, this autonomy has to be understood in the context of a 
dimension of control. This control is possible with information and information permits 
achieving balance between the organization and the management.
This discussion makes apparent that, for a given level of systemic performance, the 
more transactions are controlled within the system, that is the more effective is its 
organization, the less information is needed by managers to control the system. The 
system has autonomy to give closure to a wider range of information. In such a case, 
there is a complementary relationship between control and autonomy.
7.3 Control-Autonomy: A Complementary Relationship
Autonomy for a structural level implies not only the possibility to give closure to 
information loops by itself, but the possibility to define its space of relevant information 
loops, that is the capacity to define policies. The former possibility just implies 
discretion for that structural level. If corporate managers were asking lower levels 
managers to adhere rigidly to above defined policies, with no option to feed into the 
organization their own appreciations, they would be denying the natural awareness of 
individuals at all levels and leaving in just one level the whole task of policy formulation.
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This approach just does not work. Complexity unfolds de facto implying that in one way 
or another policies are elaborated at several levels. Information loops are not only 
closed, but also generated at several structural levels. This gives richness and flexibility 
to respond to complex environments; this gives plasticity to the organizational structure.
In this sense, it is not unusual that policy-makers feel that major policy decisions are 
not taken by them but by those who, while operating at lower organizational levels, are 
defining de facto the issues and options of policy relevance. Policy-makers feel that they 
are rubber stamping what has already been filtered for their consideration. This 
pathological state seems to be a consequence of ill-structured information for the 
purposes of policy-making (Espejo, 1983a). This dilemma may be the outcome of a 
structural inability to produce relevant information for participation. Operating 
information systems appear to reinforce this dilemma, inviting managers to search for 
alternative sources of information. This is the policy dilemma in the use of information.
There are also difficulties in structuring effective information to support the 
implementation of organizational policies. There are inbuilt paradoxes wanting attention. 
As mentioned before, managers have to operate on the basis of distant information, that 
is they cannot posibly be informed about all details of the tasks under their control; they 
need reports about overall results and trends and only by exception about details. An 
information gap is inherent to management. Unfortunately, this is not always 
understood.
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Criteria to structure distant information seems to be at the core of the problem; there is 
here a mistaken understanding of the meaning of control.
Most managers operate under the assumption that how complex the task is it dictates 
how complete the information should be. The response of junior managers to this kind 
of excessive control is fear and unreadiness to take risks. This attitude is reflected in an 
unsatisfactory performance which is interpreted by top management as a lack of enough 
control which, in turn, leads them to increase their requests for information, adding to 
the problem. Behind this dilemma, the control dilemma, is the assumption that "you 
control what you inspect," a managerial attitude which reflects a mistaken understanding 
of control.
These two dilemmas—the policy and the control dilemmas—of course, do not stop 
organizations defining policies and implementing complex tasks. Nevertheless, the 
question is, "What is the cost of this situation in terms of human, technological, and 
financial resources?" Organizational redundancies and slack resources make it possible 
to maintain viability in enterprises despite their ineffective use of information. Managers 
get around information systems and find their own way to respond to problem situations. 
However, in the context of highly demanding environment and growing expectations, the 
marginal benefits derived from an effective information may well define the companies 
which will remain viable in the long term.
The fact that information dilemmas are so common suggest that in practice the nature 
of the coupling mechanisms is not well understood.
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It is as if managers were responding blindly to transactions, when in fact they have to 
recognize those few which are relevant to give effective closure to organizational 
processes. Our claim is that management indicators should make possible and reinforce 
this recognition.
7.4 Management Information Systems: MIS
It seems that the extraordinary developments in the field of communications- 
especially the electronic linking of physically separated devices—have not been matched 
by a parallel understanding of control processes. Thus, while complexity proliferates as 
a result of higher levels of connectivity, its management lags behind, indeed creating 
major organizational problems.
Computer technology and related developments led both managers and management 
scientists to think that information requirements to control organizational processes could 
be structured in the form of Management Information Systems (MIS). In fact, while it 
may be argued that computers have proved fairly helpful in dealing with operational 
problems—as truck dispatching systems, for instance—they have been less successful in 
answering the problems of management. Solutions to these problems require filtering; 
filtering from the huge complexity of organizational processes those aspects which are 
relevant for decision purposes. Management information systems provide managers with 
reports and, frequently, on-line access to the organization’s current performance and 
historical records.
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The term on-line is used to represent transactions entered into a device that is directly 
connected to the system.
MIS primarily serve the functions of planning, controlling, and decision-making at 
the managerial level. Generally, they condense information obtained from Operational 
Control Systems—OCS—and present it to management in the form of routine summary or 
exception reports. At the most elementary level of information systems are the 
operational control systems; an OCS is a computerized system that performs and records 
daily routine transactions necessary for organizational control; OCS serves the 
operational level of the organization; in this operational role, tasks, resources, and goals 
are predefined and highly structured; an OCS, therefore, is the only system tool 
managers can use to obtain up-to-the-minute assessments of organizational performance, 
and information concerning the current status of internal operations.
MIS have very limited analytical capabilities; in most cases, they use models to 
present data. Typically, they are oriented almost exclusively to internal control, even 
though they often bring in information from external sources.
Davis (1985) treats MIS as a broad concept including all the information systems that 
support the functional areas of the organization. Here, a distinction will be made to 
consider MIS as specifically dedicated to management-level functions.
By definition, an important amount of relevant information for management is distant 
from the action itself.
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Although there are many successful applications in aspects like inventory control, 
customer services, personnel management, accounts and so forth, they are all examples 
of amplification of human capacity to cope with large numbers; the success of systems 
applying filtering principles, such as exception reporting, has been far from the 
expectations established in the 1970s (Espejo, 1983a).
The failure of MIS has been widely discussed by management scientists (Ackoff, 
1967; Beer, 1974; Lucas, 1975; Simon, 1977; Argyris, 1977; Keen and Morton, 1981; 
Huff and Munro, 1985; Barros, 1987; Sprague and Watson, 1989).
Argyris (1977) has pointed out an implementation gap which seems to be rooted in 
deep organizational problems and not just due to the common explanations found in 
literature: MIS were not well understood by line managers; top line managers were not 
involved in persuading and selling the use of MIS to users in the organization; MIS were 
not as foolproof as they could be; MIS were technically too complex and too costly to 
create and utilize; and, MIS ignored line managers’ cognitive styles.
The contention of next chapter is to show the experience of developing a MIS at the 
Chuquicamata Mine. This MIS is called SIGEM—which stands for Sistema de 
Information para la GEstion Mina.
7.5 The Role of Data Processing and Information Systems
While the organizational structure is certainly a data processing system in itself, the 
actual reporting to a manager is influenced by the operating information systems.
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The practical relevance of this filter stems from the fact that it is perfectly possible that 
rules and criteria underlying operational information systems are inconsistent with data 
processing of the organizational structure.
Information systems structured by precise aggregation and filtering rules are effective 
only with reference to measurable tasks; on occasion, however, the complexity of the 
situation does not lend itself to precise measurement rules and the processing must be 
done by people within an established framework. For a particular manager, the need for 
one or the other depends upon the purpose and nature of managerial control of tasks. 
The filter is specific to each manager; each manager is responsible for a range of 
information systems which are the outcome of the "emphasis" that he gives to the 
organizational processes under his concern. This is the case of the manager who is 
monitoring the organizational interactions responsible for the preparation of the reports 
for which he is asking.
Emphasis is defined by the tacit procedures and rules set by the manager to monitor 
these interactions (Espejo 1983b calls them "punctuations"). These procedures and rules 
are responsible for alternative aggregations and filtering practices. The transformation 
of a report into information is done by the manager himself. The limited information 
processing capacity of any manager is usually overloaded not only by relevant data but 
also by potentially useful information. Miller’s magical number seven, plus or minus two 
is an attempt to describe human capability for processing information (Miller, 1956).
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Stamper (1973) states that this capability can be expanded if the stimulus is transmitted 
in a multi-dimensional fashion. Weber’s law of Just Noticeable Differences, the 
differences that are noticeable as a constant proportion of the stimulus, is an expresion 
of this limitation (Davis, 1974). In the end, the number of variables that the human brain 
can cope with simultaneously is limited to a handful (Lindsay and Norman, 1972).
The preceding limitations define the upper limits for the input that can be processed 
by the individual. However, these inputs are not connected by a one-one switching to 
his ongoing responses. Rather, the inputs are usually worked over and expanded by his 
central nervous system into cognitive maps of the relevant environments. Moreover, in 
addition, individuals are purposeful and choose their responses in line with their beliefs, 
values and intentions (Bern, 1970; Nauta, 1972; De Bono, 1969, 1982).
One of Maturana’s main objectives is to warn about the tendency (imposed on us by 
our language) to treat mental terms as though they could meaningfully be taken as 
description of state or structure (1970). The manager processes data and takes action. 
He is part of a tradition.
Gadamer (1976) devotes extensive discussion to the relation of the individual to 
tradition, clarifying how tradition and interpretation interact. Any individual, in 
understanding his/her world, is continually involved in activities of interpretation. That 
interpretation is based on prejudice (or pre-understanding), which includes assumptions 
implicit in the language that the person uses. That language, in turn, is learned through 
activities of interpretation.
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The individual is changed through the use of language, and the language changes 
through its use by individuals. This process is of primary importance, since it constitutes 
the background of the beliefs and assumptions that determine the nature of being of 
people. For Gadamer, history does not belong to people; they belong to it. Long before 
people understand themselves through the process of self-examination, they understand 
themselves in a self-evident way in the family, society and state in which they live. That 
is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the 
historical reality of his being.
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Chapter 8
CASE STUDY: THE MINING-MIS AT THE CHUQUICAMATA MINE
8.1 The Chuquicamata Mine
Chile’s state-controlled Corporation Nacional del Cobre de Chile (Codelco-Chile) 
is a fully-integrated producer of electrolytic copper and ranks among the world’s largest 
copper producers. Its products are high-quality copper cathodes and rods, which are sold 
worldwide. It is composed of a central office and six divisions; the Chuquicamata 
complex is one of the divisions.
More than 10,000 people work in this mine-metallurgical complex, and output 
exceeds 650,000 t of refined copper in a year (far more than 50% of Codelco’s total 
output). To achieve such quantity, 630,000 tpd of rocks, including 150,000 tpd of 
sulfide ore, must be removed daily; total removal at Sur mine is 80,000 tpd, including 
30,000 tpd of oxide ore.
The area is located at an altitude of 22°20’, and longitude 68°55’ The mines and 
associate facilities are situated in the northern part of Chile, in the Second Region of 
Antofagasta, 18 km north of Calama (120,000 people), 248 km northeast of the port of 
Antofagasta (220,000 people), 150 km east of the port of Tocopilla (30,000 people; in 
this port is its energy plant), and 1,700 km north of Santiago, the capital of Chile (Figure 
8-1). The elevation of the Chuquicamata mine at the main entrance is 2,830 m above 
sea level and areas surrounding the existing plant site are generally mountainous, with 
elevations ranging from 2,700 m to 2,900 m.
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The average temperature is about 18°C, with a maximum of 25°C in the day, and 
a minimum of -5°C in the night; annual average precipitation is 2.6 mm, measured in 
a time span of 7 years, and average relative humidity is 23 %; solar radiation is extremely 
high, ranging from 680 to 740 W/m2.
The Chuquicamata complex consists of three separate mineral deposits, numerous 
dumps containing varying amounts of copper, a concentrator, a smelter, a leach plant, 
and a refinery which includes facilities for both electro-refining and electro-winning.
At present, copper and its associated by-products are mined from both the 
Chuquicamata (sulfide ore) and Sur (oxide ore) open pit mines. A third copper orebody, 
Mansa Mina-located between Calama and Chuquicamata with geological resources of 
between 650 and 900 Mt averaging 1.3% copper—is currently being planned for 
production and may play a future role in Chuquicamata’s mining strategy.
On May 18, 1915, The Guggenheim Exploration Company, began industrial-scale 
operations at Chuquicamata mine. Chuquicamata was bought by the Guggenheims in 
1912 and sold to Anaconda in 1922. The mine was twice brought to the attention of the 
Guggenheims, first in 1900 when the Guggenheims were busy with other matters and 
were not yet interested in copper and a second time, in 1910, by a Boston lawyer, A.C 
Burrage, the original promoter of Chuquicamata, who had originally intended the mine 
for Anaconda. In 1922, Anaconda offered what seemed like a fantastic price for the 
mine, US$140 million. The Guggenheims accepted, although the acceptance forever 
destroyed the family cohesiveness (Navin, 1978).
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Until 1953 Chuquicamata was an oxide mine, and its electrowon product was more 
suitable for brass shapes than for electrical wiring. Chuquicamata did not begin to 
process its sulfide ores until 1953, when it completed its own electrolytic refinery.
It is known that in earlier times, the Chuco Indians—Quechuas and Aymaraes’ 
ancestral people—used copper to manufacture, in a very rudimentary way, some domestic 
utensils and weapons. The name Chuquicamata comes from those people and it means 
Land o f the Chuco Indians. Now, being a large amphitheater, the mine is almost 78 
years old, 4,200 m long; 2,600 m wide; and, 645 m deep. Sur mine is 1,700 m long, 
1,600 m wide, and, 221 m deep.
Management at Chuquicamata is divided into three major areas: mining, processing, 
and administration. Mining, in turn, is divided into four departments: geology, planning, 
operations, and maintenance (Figure 8-2). These four departments contain a large 
number of highly integrated operations which can typically be aggregated by phases: 
drilling, blasting, loading, hauling, crushing, plus a general area including services which 
are difficult to typify (Figure 8-3). More than 3,000 people work in the mining, which 
has operating expenses of about US$220 million a year (one-fourth of the total in the 
division).
8.2 The Management Information System: SIGEM
In 1984, mining operation control at Chuquicamata was realized through a number 
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Because areas overlapped, redundancies and particular interpretations occurred.
An example to illustrate this situation was the computation of major equipment 
availability. In the case of shovels, for instance, electromechanical failures were 
simultaneously registered by the truck dispatching system and by people who were in 
charge of shovels maintenance. Data stored in the maintenance information system were 
those provided by these people. The operations area, in turn, stored data coming from 
dispatching system. So two different values for availability were generated. For 
maintenance people the repair time began at the instant they were notified of such a need; 
for operations people, downtime began at the instant the shovel stopped working.
The difference became a problem when maintenance people were occupied fixing two 
or more shovels and were not available to be notified of additional breakdowns. To 
solve the situation, communication had to be improved.
In the case of trucks, earth-moving equipment, and blasting drill hole machines, the 
situation was quite similar. This simple fact does not justify by itself the later 
development management control reached, but it demonstrated that people were engaged 
in different objectives.
Further, incentive mechanisms—monetary rewards—of the organization were also 
oriented in this direction: incentives for maintenance people were a function of equipment 
availability, while incentives for operations people were a function of the mining rate. 
Indeed data uniqueness was a need, but the background to the facts showed that reporting 
had to be reconciled.
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At that time, mining rates were approximately 400,000 tpd, and a number of 
problems concemings volume and routine needed to be solved; a new uncertainty level 
in the operations existed; these uncertainties were caused by mobile, widely dispersed 
pieces of major equipment and ever-changing, non-uniform mining conditions. In fact, 
a mining firm must develop a high level of flexibility to face the problems stemming 
from a high uncertainty level; flexibility is the characteristic of production systems which 
are able to assume numerous and even unforeseen states.
Managers saw themselves as decision makers and considered information to be 
important, the content of which was to change the understanding of some part of a 
decision.
There was a generalized animus state to consider a fast implementation of a system 
to satisfy information needs. Such a system should procure each item of source data to 
be entered only once, and thereafter combine it in various ways to provide the summaries 
needed for all functions. There are three key words behind this statement: collecting, 
storing, and disseminating. The management would be primarily concerned with 
controlling and monitoring operational activities and the use of organizational resources; 
in this context, standards would be inputs. The degree of management support was 
absolute, and the top manager had high expectations for the system’s performance.
In September 1987, the management control system—SIGEM—was operating. The 
production phases and their characteristic resources are shown in Figure 8-4, and the 









































































The database is composed of 10 modules: production, human resources, material 
resources, major equipment, maintenance, cost accountability, operational expenses, 
investments, and the database management system (Rojas, 1989). A description of each 
follows:
(1) Production Module. This works on-line with the Trucks Dispatching System (a real­
time control system). It holds data related to materials movement in the phases of 
loading, hauling, and crushing. This includes tons loaded by each shovel and front-
loader; tons hauled by each truck and tons crushed by each crusher; and control of 
pushback, stocks, ore attributes, and hauling distances. Additionally, it holds data 
related to timing events (such as utilization and repairs) of each type of equipment 
and facility mentioned.
(2) Human Resources. This module keeps information related to personnel: personal 
data, payroll, time worked, benefits, training, safety, performance records, and 
others.
(3) Material Resources. This refers to relevant consumables such as oil, energy, water, 
explosives, giant tires, belts, replacement parts for trucks, shovels and crushers.
(4) Mai or Equipment. This module holds technical and performance data related to 
drilling rigs, hole blasting machines, earth moving equipment, shovels, off-road 
trucks, crushers, and supporting equipment, such as water trucks, fuel trucks, etc.
(5) The Maitenance Module Works on-line with the maintenance information system 
which is based on a work order system.
T-4099 123
It holds data related to the maintenance services provided and associated costs; for 
example, the cost incurred to provide a determined level of reliability and availability 
to some equipment is included; it also holds maintenance programs for each facility 
and piece of equipment.
(6) Operation Expenses. In this module are detailed relations of operational expenses 
incurred by each center of cost; cost center and expense center, at Chuquicamata, are
used interchangeably. A cost center is associated with a responsibility center and its 
inputs and outputs are clearly distinguished. At Chuquicamata mine, a responsibility 
center is an organizational unit headed by a manager who is responsible for its 
activities; for example, the Hauling Truck Unit is a responsibility center and has 
associated with it a center of cost; a superintendence is composed of a number of 
responsibility centers, and is by itself a responsibility center with an associated cost 
center. A department has a number of superintendencies, is a responsibility center 
and is associated with a cost center.
A responsibility center has its own objectives which are oriented to accomplish the 
objectives of the whole organization; it uses inputs such as material resources, labor, 
and other services, and requires working capital, equipment and other assets to 
produce outputs. In this module, the inputs of each responsibility center are 
expressed in monetary terms and are compared to its respective budgeting.
(7) Cost Accountability. This module relates the production and operating expense 
modules to provide unified costs.
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These unitary costs are related to each phase, each piece of equipment, by processes, 
by type of product, and so forth.
(8) Investments. This contains all the necessary data to feed equipment replacement 
models; data include cost curves, operational relations, maintenance parameters and 
budgeting constraints.
(9) Database Management. This module is composed of application programs, the data 
dictionary, and management software. There are four characteristic elements in this 
module. The first, is data, the physical reality which resides on disk pack, is called 
the database. Within the database are all of the data elements that are of interest; 
here the data are stored in one location, defined once and consistently. All the 
applications use them in that area.
The second element is the software package; it acts as an interface between 
application programs and the physical data files; when the application program calls 
for a data element--like tons of ore crushed yesterday, for instance--this management 
system database finds this element in the database and presents it to the application 
program.
The third is the set of application programs that request data elements from the 
database. A feature of database management systems is that they come with their 
own application development language; this is called a data manipulation language 
and is a fourth-generation language (a user-friendly language).
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SQL (Structured Query Language) was used in the system with the intention that both 
managers and assistants could enter a few simple queries to generate a report. The 
fourth element is the data dictionary. This is an automated file that stores definitions of 
data elements and data characteristics such as usage, physical representation, ownership 
(who in the organization is responsible for maintaining the data), authorization and 
security mechanisms. The most important feature of a database management system 
(DMS) is that "it knows where and how the data are actually stored" (Laudon and 
Laudon, 1991). Suppose, for example, that you want to know what happened in your 
operation yesterday; in your view, all seemed normal but the results are far from what 
you supposed. You want to take a look at hauling operations by trucks.
Suppose that you desired view of the data is the one below (this view will be called 
logical view).
Fleet Dist.(Km) Grade (%) Haulage (000 f) Utiliz.(%) Perform.(t/hrl
Cat 195 5.61 29.2 1,273.4 79.2 53.3
Dresser-205 4.23 29.4 972.1 81.0 52.1
Euclid -170 4.33 28.9 561.2 70.4 34.9
Wabco -170 4.80 27.0 490.1 60.3 38.8
You use this view to shape the application program. The DMS translates your logical 
view into a physical view of the data, assembles the required data elements—which reside 
in different files and different disk locations— and presents the information according to 
the logical view for which you asked.
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This kind of interactive report creation could have been the main strength for the 
SIGEM at Chuquicamata, but became the main weakness. The reason was resistance to 
change, including the changes imposed on the organization and those caused by managers 
experimenting. In the former, the "avalanche" of data generated by the system indicated, 
in some cases, the lack of planning; there were indicators without respective standards. 
In the latter, the problem was far more complex.
The implementation of the management control system threatened the stability of 
some work positions and the status level of some people in the organization. SIGEM had 
made the information needed to monitor and control activities simultaneously available 
to the top manager, to middle managers, to supervisors, and to individual workers. The 
information gathering and control functions which had preserved the position of some 
middle managers became less necessary.
Additionally, some staff positions were no longer needed. However, the main 
problem involved the customers of the system. As in any project there were factions 
which had to be managed. By using Carpenter’s terms (1988), there are "disciples," 
those who are the supporters of the innovation, "opponents" those who believe the 
project is not in the organization’s interests or who stood to lose if it was accepted, and 
"indifferents," those who were doing too many other things to get involved. After 
managers were trained to use the application programs, the problem derived from the low 
response time of the system, and the instability of the communication lines.
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Transactions involved in managers’ requests were of such magnitude that the system 
was unable to respond appropriately. A simple request relating to truck performance for 
a given period of time involves a huge number of transactions. If a manager wanted to 
know what had happened yesterday with his trucks, for instance, he would be asking for 
the performance of 120 trucks, and for parameters such as those in the logical view 
shown above. On the other hand, the wide dispersion of terminals, the high levels of 
shock and vibrations, the wide ranges in operating and storage temperatures, and the 
ever-changing levels of dust in the air were difficult obstacles to overcome. Optical fiber 
technology later solved these problems, but the system continued to inundate managers 
with data.
8.3 A System Is Never Built; It Is Always Being Built
Solutions to the preceding problems were implemented by structuring processes to 
answer predetermined questions; thus, when a user asked for some of these questions, 
the system answered within a more reasonable time. Even though the top manager said 
he was satisfied, the rest of the organization was dissatisfied. (For the first time in 
years, managers realized that someone was there to pass them the "bill.") The top 
manager used the system to detect those managers who systematically displayed 
important deviations from their objectives. After a while, and for other reasons, the top 
manager was removed. As top manager, the main customer, and the driving force of the 
system, his removal implied that managerial control of the system was over.
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But, on the other hand, in focusing the system on an ontology in terms of data, the 
system was inundating managers with details of specific situations and, with few 
exceptions, managers were not reading reports.
In some aspects, the system had proved to be a valuable one—providing for a 
relational database and query languages, and modeling the equipment replacement, for 
instance—but it was apparent that, in not being the former top manager and its main 
customer, its domain of action had become a secondary domain. Some of the solutions 
offered by the system had become natural ways of working within the organization—not 
without previous resistance—and what was apparent is that line managers were using a 
very small part of the system’s potential.
Additionally, the new top manager was aware that he had to make the organizational 
structure more effective and was engaged in a high level of interactions with people in 
the immediate lower level; in other words, his only information system was the 
organizational structure. This situation made managers in the lower level utilize the MIS 
to respond to specific requests from above.
In fact, the organizational position of the system was moved from a staff position in 
the top manager level toward a supporting position in the second level within the mine 
planning area. This breakdown generated the questions, "what can be done next?" or 
even better, "what can the system offer?"
Nevertheless, one thing was clear. People working in the front line need a huge 
amount of data; they are the only level in the organization that processes data.
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If a system could expand their efforts, they would be very satisfied, since they are 
not only the ones processing data but the first level generating information upward; from 
here up, the organization structure is an assemblage of filters which always bring an 
attenuated version of events to the managers. This is not surprising, since it is what the 
structure is supposed to do: provide for a network of channels determining the patterns 
of information flows in the organization. The higher a manager’s position, the more 
distant he will be from the events occurring in his operation; therefore, his view of 
situations depends upon those representations coming through the structure; these 
correspond to impressions that his own people generated on the belief that these 
representations corresponded to the facts.
This argument demonstrates how important the design is to the structure. A 
management information system cannot be viable unless the characteristics of the 
organization in which the system resides are well understood and internalized.
This understanding begins with accepting that the front line is the main customer of 
the system in terms of data; after that, the higher the customer’s position, the more 
elaborate the information must be; in other words, the higher the manager’s position, the 
more exhaustive the filtering process must be. In terms of data and information, an MIS 
must offer something different to that which organizational structure already is offering.
Espejo and Watt (1988) argue that a manager’s concern is only with the residual 
complexity—relevant to his purposes—left unanttended by the structure; this complexity 
defines his information needs.
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If the structure does not work as it is supposed to work, then the solution to the 
problem is not in the information system. It is in redesigning the structure. 
Communication channels provided in the structure are there not only to exclusively 
transmit information or symbols, but also to transmit commitments and interpretations. 
Indeed an MIS can help to detect anomalies, and can suggest courses of action but, 
definitely, the decision about what to do is in other hands.
People in each level of the organization need to think permanently about what kind 
of information—the contents of which are interpretations—they require to comply with 
their commitments and to cooperate with the achievement of others’ commitments. In 
this perspective, an individual’s main customer is his boss but, at the same time, he 
makes requests of others to comply with his promises so that he is somebody else’s main 
customer. However, the conditions of satisfaction are associated with "fit. ”
An analogy can illustrate this: the customer is only satisfied by a dress that fits, and 
a complex linguistic domain—the domain of clothing sizes—has been generated to provide 
a means of anticipating and preventing breakdown. But "fitting" cannot be objectively 
defined. One person may be happy with an article that someone else of the same overall 
shape and size would reject. The history of fashion and the differences between cultures 
make it clear that "fitting" is an interpretation within a particular horizon. But at the 
same time, it is not purely individual. The background shared by a community is what 
makes individual "tastes" possible.
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The case of "fit" may seem extreme, but every condition of satisfaction ultimately 
rests on a declaration by an individual, within the background of a community. The 
cases that seem "objective" are those in which there is a great regularity and for which 
possible conversations about satisfaction have been regularized, as in a legal system, for 
instance (Winograd and Flores, 1986).
Flores (1982) says that an information system dedicated to collecting data and 
answering predetermined questions, even a supremely well-designed one, will be harmful 
if it is not complemented by heterodox practices in a permanent attitude of openness to 
listening. These heterodox practices have to do with the permanent change and rotation 
of people, the fostering of conversations with new people, incorporating external 
consultants, reading books having nothing to do with the professional discipline, visiting 
different places, and so forth.
Despite the fact that these arguments had been exhaustively considered and that, in 
general, the reports generated by the system were appreciated, especially the daily 
reports, it was apparent that something was missing. Structural resistance, or inertia, can 
be an important factor constraining the room for innovation. DTribame (1990) says that 
the internal structure of each workplace acts as a brake on any evolution not in line with 
its past developments. A good deal of effort, as a consequence, must be oriented to get 
allies and to provide tools that become of managerial interest.
Implementation is a control process in which the first attempts are made to collect 
performance data, compare it to expectations, and align discrepances.
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Control systems, which are part of the infrastructure, are imperfectly developed. As an 
organization tries to eliminate apparent discrepancies it must also improve the reliability 
and validity of these systems.
Once more, based in part on information from the imperfect control systems, 
individuals estimate the innovation’s consequences for themselves. Those who believe 
they are adversely affected (especially who have little need for the technology or who 
display low competence on the job) will stubbornly resist. However, a well designed 
MIS must have an adequate accesibility for those individuals who have a high need or 
high competence on their jobs.
One way an organization becomes aware of innovation is when it is facing a major 
breakdown and must search for ways to improve performance. A performance gap is 
often stressed as the motivation for innovation (Hage, 1980). An organization assesses 
its survival capability by identifying positive differences between the values of objectives 
and performance on relevant dimensions. To eliminate these differences it develops new 
action plans including process innovation (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992).
This condition existed at Chuquicamata mine when its mining rate had to jump from
400,000 tpd to 630,000 tpd in 1990. The performance gap, however, did not result from 
a crisis but from an opportunity: that is, an increase in aspirations due to the less quality 
of ore attributes and the need of maintaining the production level. In reaching a mining 
rate of 630,000 tpd, the operation dynamism increased to levels unknown within the 
organization and under similar conditions the performance was absolutely different.
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There were other levels of uncertainty in the organization as a result of the new 
complexity level in its operations. The need to respond quickly had increased. There 
was now a need to manage a much higher level of interdependence and, even though an 
effective organizational coordination is the appropriate structural response, the specific 
structural response varies with the type of coordination needed.
8.4 An additional Comment
In taking the business as a composite, it is possible to examine the networks of 
interactions—conversations—among its constituents, departments, work-groups and 
individual workers. No analysis of existing recurrent structures is a full account of 
possibilities. The existing networks represent a particular point of structural coupling of 
the organization to the world in which they exist. Actions may radically alter the 
structure. In some cases, the business as a whole may have a new interpretation. No 
methodology can guarantee that all such possibilities will be found, but a careful analysis 
of the whole structure can help reveal places with a potential for expansion.
The conceptual framework underpinning this thesis is the management of complexity, 
and in particular the strategies used by managers to cope with the complexity of their 
information/action space. Three strategies—namely, structural adjustments, improved 
conversations, and better manager-to-task fit—are aimed at achieving an effective balance 
between their perceived information needs and their limited information processing 
capacities.
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The strategies imply the design of effective attenuators of "world" complexity and 
effective amplifiers of managerial complexity.
In designing computer-based tools, one is not in the position of creating a formal 
"system" that covers the functioning of the organization and the people within it. When 
this is attempted, the resulting system (and the space of potential action for the people 
within it) is inflexible and unable to cope with the new breakdowns or potentials. Instead 
one designs additions and changes to the network of equipment within which people 
work.
The computer is like a tool, in that it is available for use by people engaged in some 
domain of action. The use of the tool shapes the potential for what those actions are and 
how they are conducted. The computer’s power does not lie in having a single purpose, 
but in its connection to the larger network of communication (electronic, telephone, and 
paper-based) in which organizations operate.
So far, an important portion of what has been said in this study is independent of 
computers. It applies to organizations, whether they operate with the most modem 
equipment or with ledger pads and quills. It is also not a prescription for what 
organizations should do, but an analysis of what they are already doing. If one examines 
what computers are doing in settings like the examples shown, it is possible to find them 
embodying possibilities for action within a set of recurrent conversations. Whether it be 
a payroll system or an inventory control system, the hardware and software are a 
medium in which requests and promises are made and monitored.
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There is a wide range of possibilities, including the standard packages now prominent 
in commercial applications. In each case, the question is not that of "what kind of 
system is needed?" but a concrete one of how different tools will lead to new 
conversations and in the end to new ways of working.
A major mining operation such as the one at Chuquicamata mine has three major 
aspects to consider: the first is related to how effectively the technology is being used; 
the highly capital-intensive nature of the business makes this a crucial point.
The second has to do with concerns over the quality of worklife and the related 
issues of employee motivation, absenteeism, and turnover.
The third is related to work-group and higher level organizational issues. There will 
undoubtedly be fewer employees in the operation of the future, and the remaining 
individuals, by virtue of their responsibility for expensive and critical resources, will 
have considerable influence over the process. They must be highly motivated and work 
together as effectively as possible.
As shown in Chapter 4, sociotechnical theorists suggest that, in these cases, 
organizations should be designed so that people are in roles complementary to machines 
rather than being extensions of machines (Jordan, 1979). They maintain that there is 
always more than a single way to design the technical system and some of the alternative 
ways lead to not just better social system solutions but also to more effective total 
organizational designs.
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Matrix structures provide the most intensive coordination, but at a significant cost: 
in complexity, in increased management, in the number of meetings, and in the stress 
created by intensive lateral communications. This last is the most restrictive aspect, 
especially when technical and internal operations become increasingly complex as a result 
of the new dynamics in the level of activities within the organization. In such a case, 
the planning process and mutual adjustments are appropriate coordination mechanisms. 
In both coordination mechanisms, however, the interaction level increases even more 
which shows the relevance about thinking of organizational conversations purposefully.
In designing the organization’s future through the planning process and in 
implementing operational missions through the organizational actor’s commitments a high 
increasing level of interdependence is achieved. In this context, the boundaries of the 
primary work system—that is, the basic organizational unit—are drawn when there is a 
natural break between the interdependencies of one system and those of another. These 
boundaries should be drawn in order to get appropriate coordination, communication, and 
satisfaction of the involved teams. Design principles of sociotechnical systems are 
oriented to improve organizational performance. Key aspects in this domain are the 
definition of boundary management, variance control, organizational philosophy and 
values, and the definition of appropriate autonomy levels.
The pressure on the middle level of the organization at the Chuquicamata mine is 
apparent. It goes without saying that, as a result of information technology and the high 
interdependence level, the middle level is being compressed.
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Moreover, the high need of lateral relationships and communication mentioned above are 
collapsing traditional boundaries at the matrix structure in this organization. So the 
networks of commitments and the conversations in which people participate are becoming 
larger and more complex, and the complexity of the organization has gone beyond the 
point where it can be controlled without appropriate tools.
Conventional approaches to controlling and motivating the members of the 
organization to achieve organizational goals are losing their effectiveness. As a result, 
the organization is becoming highly vulnerable and dependent on the commitment of its 
members, a commitment that requires new work values, explicit operating philosophies, 
and significant changes to the organizational culture.
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PART V




9.1 About Management Indicators
Kador (1989) reports a story, possibly apocryphal, which circulates in the halls of 
the Big Eight accounting firms. It seems that an auditor developed the habit of drawing 
a small "smiley face" on the cover sheet of a positive financial report for a client. When 
the auditor retired, his replacement eliminated this symbol as unprofessional, a gimmick. 
When that year’s report, lacking the customary icon, went to the client, the client was 
on the phone with the new auditor within minutes, "Give me the bad news," he groaned, 
"I can take it.” It turned out that in years past, the client had rarely read the report, 
relying instead on the smile that, he assumed, told him his financial condition was 
cheery. The auditor had created a primitive, and apparently appreciated, management 
indicator for the client.
Using a simple signal to tell a complicated story is indeed one aspect of a 
management indicator. Its function is oriented to make raw data easier to assimilate; it 
is a complexity filter. It is a key indicator system. In the key indicator system, the 
manager makes the effort to identify those factors, his commitments, that are most likely 
to contribute to the success of his organization. A second element of this particular 
approach is reporting by exception (Figure 9-1). This involves the selection of key 
discriminators to report by exception rather reporting all of the elements involved in the 
operations.
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This key indicator approach lets him focus on the particular aspects, commitments, and 
ratios that are most likely to indicate key changes which may necessitate decisions. No 
one disagrees about the need of filtering from the huge complexity of organizational 
processes those aspects which are relevant for decision purposes. But that is where the 
agreements ends.
ACTION
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Figure 9-1 Reporting by Exception
In the above, attenuation has been the main concern. What about amplification? The 
framework for management indicators implies the logical necessity of amplifies varieties 
operating in parallel with a variety of attenuators.
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If managers manage their information input adequately and achieve an appropriate 
appreciation of the situations relevant to them, they may still fail to be effective because 
of their inability to "distribute the necessary action." In managing information for 
organizational control, it must pay equal attention to both processes. This is a matter of 
crucial importance and some literature where this aspect of information for management 
has been stressed is difficult to find.
If managerial action is intended to produce organizational action, amplification is 
essential. In exactly the same way that it is impossible for a manager to have adequate 
appreciation for the organizational tasks without an appropriate attenuation, it is 
imposible for him to act with sufficient effectiveness on these tasks without appropriate 
amplification.
9.2 Guidelines for Designing
Organizational structure has been studied by splitting it into discrete variables 
(complexity, formalization, configuration, coordination and control) that can be measured 
through comparable situations. For the purposes of both attenuation and amplification, 
spaces of action have been suggested: (1) adjustments to the organizational structure; (2) 
the design of organizational conversations; and (3) the manager-to-tasks fit.
Indeed, adjustments to the structure can make information management more 
effective. These changes can be major or minor, suggesting different processes.
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The idea in either case is the same: from the viewpoint of a particular manager, 
depending upon his appreciation of the tasks of his concern, some structures are likely 
to absorb the complexity more effectively than others.
Appropriate changes in the structure should increase, not only the effectiveness of 
the organization as a whole, but also the manager’s ability to match relevant complexity. 
On the other hand, each manager is constantly involved in the task of coordinating his 
action and the actions of others; this coordination implies commitments of the "world to 
word" kind. The manager’s success in exchanging commitments for action, through the 
conversational process, will define the level of amplification achieved in this space of 
action.
A strategy for information management to improve interpersonal interactions in the 
organization should offer more effective ways of increasing the chance of meaningful 
commitments, increasing the chances of coordinated action, and increasing the chances 
of learning of inevitable breakdowns. In fact, perceiving "too many" breakdowns would 
be a symptom indicating the need for this strategy.
These breakdowns may be produced by invalid information flowing through the 
organizational structure, or by weak commitments made without a true understanding of 
the situation. These are all indications of poor conversations.
While uninhibited communications are essential for effective attenuation of task 
complexity, commitments for action are essential for effective amplification of 
managerial action.
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The degree to which a manager is able to extract patterns out of a wealth of data 
(attenuate) and, on the other hand, his ability to regenerate/create (amplify) in his own 
mind—based on a limited possible inflow of data—the complexity of the external world 
is responsible for very different levels of performance.
This ability relates to cognitive capabilities and to cognitive styles (Miller, 1956; 
Mitroff and Kitman, 1975; Davis and Olson, 1985). Espejo and Watt (1988) say that the 
richer the models held by the manager about his tasks, the fewer inputs he needs to 
appreciate the current state of affairs; the manager will be able to "create" a relatively 
complex understanding of the situation just by making mental connections, thus reducing 
his information needs.
The design problem in this third strategy (manager-to-task fit) must comprehend the 
other two strategies stressed earlier (structural adjustments and improved conversations). 
The design must consider several aspects: first, it must be oriented to improve the mental 
models held by the manager; better models of reality increase the manager’s capacity to 
deal with information.
Thus it would help the manager if he could explicitly make his tacit models of the 
world organization, and especially those limiting his abilities to handle complexity. As 
long as managers hold models like "you control what you inspect" or "management is 
about making decisions," the likelihood is that they will find themselves in information 
dilemmas, unable to accept the information gaps which are inherent in management 
(Espejo, 1983a).
T-4099 144
Second, using the information technology to attenuate the complexity of the world 
in line with the manager’s capabilities, and also to amplify his action capacity.
This space of possibilities, if managed effectively, will increase the manager’s ability to 
cope with complexity.
Third, using the information technology for controlling key variances as close to the 
source as possible; in this way, it can be used to coordinate corrective action.
Fourth, the manager’s success in exchanging commitments for action, through the 
conversational process, will define the level of amplification of the organization’s 
mission. So he should use the information technology as a help to make explicit the 
networks of commitments in the organization. The reason for doing it is that the 
networks of commitments and the conversations in which people participate are becoming 
larger and more complex, and the complexity of organizations has gone beyond the point 
where it can be controlled without appropriate tools.
9.3 Designing Management Indicators
One of the most universally accepted pieces of advice from old and experienced 
managers is Plan your work, work your plan (in Fulmer, 1988, p.346). The advice 
could hardly be stated in more a simple fashion. Yet contained within those last three 
words is an apt summary for this section.
Although a number of possibilities illustrate how management indicators work, an 
important one will be introduced here as a preliminary foundation.
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This is budgeting. Budgeting is one of the most important and pervasive techniques for 
controlling operations. The word budget, however, has developed a rather negative 
connotation for most managers because it has often been the reason why actions could 
not be done. Some companies have tried a little positive thinking by referring to their 
profit plans instead of their budgets (Fulmer, 1988). Whatever the name, financial 
planning and anticipation of expenditures are meant to be the slaves of business, not the 
masters.
Putting expenditure plans on paper in exact amounts, and leaving no blank spaces for 
maybe’s, allow a manager to know exactly where he is going. Numbers force a kind of 
orderliness which minimizes disconcerting surprises. Every manager, from the front-line 
supervisor to the top manager, has a budget that is used to help control his performance 
(Fulmer, 1988).
With the exception of small mining companies, it is virtually impossible for the top 
manager to have full knowledge about all factors interacting in the budgeting process. 
Neither can a middle manager have an adequate perspective to make decisions which will 
optimize the performance of major segments in the organization. In determined 
circumstances he can be a reliable source of information and, for this reason, act as a 
part of the major decision-making team. In small mining companies, the budgeting 
process is usually initiated by the top manager through his strategic planning efforts. In 
big mining companies, however, budgets can be initiated at lower management levels, 
but this makes it difficult to tie budgets to strategies and long-term goals.
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At Chuquicamata mine, strategies and long-term goals are oriented towards 
improving the competitiveness of the operation-reducing operating costs and increasing 
the productivity. The situation described above can be applied to it. This situation 
created the need to establish an integrator program for the budgeting process, whose 
objective was, on the one hand, to maintain the necessary global vision of top 
management and, on the other hand, to give feedback to the rest of the managers to 
allow them to know their contributions to the total mining cost.
9.3.1 An Example: A Budgeting Integrator Program. At Chuquicamata mine, the 
budgeting process can reach such detailed levels that it becomes extremely difficult to 
correlate from an integrator perspective. Every department has its own budgeting 
coordinator who is willing to care of his organization’s interests. Budgeting at 
Chuquicamata mine is a bottom-up process and, as a result, the top manager receives 
knowledge of it through the organizational structure.
The narrative derived from the short-term mine planning process consists of two 
sequential steps. In the first, the production plan is defined; here, organizational actors 
establish a network of commitments which chiefly consists of mining capacity 
estimations. Put in simple terms, a concentrator has a fixed ore processing capacity, ore 
attributes are known and, therefore, a certain mining rate is required to feed the 
concentrator. This mining rate has been adequately supported in the long-term planning 
process, so that the commitments are related to availability and reliability of the 
necessary resources: labor, crushers, trucks, and so forth to achieve the production plan.
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The second step starts once all managers have been informed of the production plan, 
and consists of a series of related plans that each manager considers necessary to realize 
the main production plan. These related plans—budgets—are numerical statements about 
those evaluations which, as a result of the actions realized by each responsibility center, 
will be produced. All budgets are based on the objectives established by the production 
plan; they are no more than expressions of expectations in numerical terms. These 
statements are expressed in both financial and physical terms; the latter includes labor, 
materials, and services.
Figure 9-2 shows the actual situation in general terms, including operational phases, 
centers of responsibility, the number of structural levels, the mining-MIS and 
interrelationships in terms of data and information. Each responsibility center is expected 
to prepare a budget, with staff help, for the next year. This is not an entirely new 
process each year; in most cases, the previous year’s budget is the starting point; in fact, 
it is not uncommon to observe slight alterations to previous budgets. Some real problems, 
however, stem from this situation, and which will be mentioned later.
Anderson (1984) notes that the overall purpose of budgeting is to allow decision­
making authority to be delegated to lower-level managers, while maintaining control. 
By agreeing on planned expenditures of resources and then monitoring progress as the 
year goes on, managers can keep on top of the financial decisions made at lower levels, 























































This is one of the important ways in which top management determines the direction 
its organization will take for the next year: by approving budgetary changes once they 
are requested. On the other side, low- and mid-managers adequately prepare new 
budgetary requests, such as cost-benefits, to maximize the probability of their approval.
Budgets must be approved both by the controller’s office and by top management. 
The important considerations at this step are the changes made from the previous year. 
Most low- and mid-level managers want to do new things—build new buildings, hire new 
people, buy new machines or equipment—and top management must decide who gets a 
chance at new projects.
Budgets also clarify the responsibilities of each manager and define the decisions they 
can and cannot make without approval from above. The top manager establishes dates 
and deadlines for preparing and reviewing lower level budgets, which as a whole 
constitute the first narrative to accomplish the mission. This first narrative, relative to 
budgets, is something like the "desires fountain." The top manager has to evaluate 
consistency and coherency in them, and compares some key indicator with his 
expectations. In Figure 9-3, an integrated scheme of this first narrative is shown. It can 
seem contradictory, describing, on the one hand, a budgeting process and, on the other 
hand, showing unitary cost. However, both are closely related and is the interrelation 
between the production plan and budget is shown.
Suppose that the total operation mining cost in the last financial exercise was 
CUS$16.4/lb of Cu° extracted.
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After seeing the global figures (Figure 9-4), the manager realizes that the projected cost 
is CUS$19.6/lb. Indeed the manager knows that the mining conditions are different: 
equipment is a year older and the new labor contract is more expensive than the old one. 
The manager cannot allow himself the luxury to increase the cost in such a proportion; 
and, even though later on he has to accept the force of the facts, before that he must be 
sure.
Once budgets are approved, each responsibility center’s performance is compared to 
its budget throughout the year. Performance reports are used usually to provide 
information to line managers so that they can take necessary actions to keep things on 
target. However, given the huge number of factors constituting the expenditures in each 
area, these reports are normally voluminous.
9.3.2 The Budgeting Integrator Program at Work. The technical problems with budgets, 
for the most part, relate to how the budget is used in the overall management framework 
of the organization. Managers are often expected to "meet the budget" rather than reach 
goals that would further the performance of their unit; moreover, if some of them run 
over their budgets, it does not mean that their unit stops working; the necessary resources 
to keep working the unit will be available to them, even though they go in excess. The 
manager must explain the underlying reason and solve it.
Another technical problem is overbudgeting. This happens when many trivial items 
are budgeted, making the budget unwieldy. When this happens, expenses rise and 




























Overbudgeting also hinders a manager’s flexibility in adapting to changing conditions 
throughout the year. Obviously, budgets must control the expenses for a responsibility 
center, so some flexibility and autonomy is allowed. Past inefficiencies are often 
perpetuated by budgets. It is common for budgets to be simple extensions of or minor 
additions to past budgets, which means that errors in past budgets are likely to remain 
uncorrected. Zero-based budgeting is a technique that circumvents this problem. 
Sometimes it is necessary to revise a budget during the budget cycle, since external or 
internal events make certain components in the first budget unrealistic. Finally, because 
of power and politics in the organization, budgets may not be as objective as they should 
be. The truck unit, for instance, has operation expenses of USS63 million a year; it is 
not difficult for its manager to obtain, say, $300,000 for reconditioning the truck drivers’ 
building; this request is less than 0.5% of the total and it can well be part of the 
rounding. However, for the mine planning department manager, to obtain $300,000 for 
a new project related to rock mechanics may be more difficult. He will have to justify 
the need, since his request is about 10% of his budget. Solving these kinds of problems 
requires conflict management and, of course, conversations (Figure 9-5).
Some interpersonal problems frequently occur during the budgeting process. Budgets 
may cause managers to unite against the top management, especially when they feel they 




Human and technical problems can be minimized by giving some common-sense 
attention to the budgeting process. Three essentials factors keep the process on track:
(1) At Chuquicamata mine, line and top managers are involved in the budgeting process. 
Top management keeps the process focused and in line with strategic directions. 
Through conversations and commitments, top managers ensure that what should be 
controlled through the budget is clear to everybody. In this conversational process, 
they understand both goals and standards, and the budgets are directly connected to 
plans and goals. Figure 9-4 shows the contribution each area adds to the total cost. 
A manager can observe the major deviations and establish the corresponding 
conversations.
(2) Limit budgets to essential items. Flexibility and departmental adjustments for each 
responsibility center must be built in for both motivational and technical reasons. 
Motivationally, flexibility encourages entrepreneurship at lower levels where 
decisions can be made quickly and accurately (Monks, 1987).
Technically, it is unlikely that top management can foresee everything that will crop 
up during the year, and even if they could, making decisions on every budget item 
quickly can swamp them whereas others could do the job more efficiently. Budgets 
for each responsibility center and the disaggregating of some relevant aspects are 
shown in Figure 9-5.
(3) Give feedback on budget performance to managers as frequently as necessary.
This gives them a chance to make corrections before things get too far out of line.
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Quick budgetary feedback requires good organization within the mining-MIS. It also 
means that budgets must be structured so that any variances can be pinpointed and 
information can be returned to the right responsibility center. In Figure 9-4, it is 
possible to observe that both loading and hauling phases show a variation of 0.8C/lb. 
These variations can require a higher level of disaggregating, which is shown for 
each phase in Figures 9-6 and 9-7. It is important to note that the manager is the one 
who must define his stability band.
This analysis process can be extended to other relevant variables in operations. It 
can be extended to measure, evaluate, and adjust performance in the workplace to 
implement operational missions. Generally speaking, operations refers to managing the 
materials, equipment, and personnel used to accomplish a mission; it means management 
of the workplace (Anderson, 1984). Although operations managers are responsible for 
meeting and controlling virtually all the goals regarding the product (including budgets), 
their work can be subdivided into four distinct areas.
These four areas are time, safety and risks prevention, quantity, and quality.
9.4 Controlling Operations
9.4.1 Time. Profits in a company may be 10% of total revenues. At mining rates of
630,000 tpd, a 5% difference in time utilization in the productive system can have a 
great effect. Supposing a linear extrapolation, a 5% extra time utilization can mean a 








The amount of ore sent to the concentrator cannot be discussed. The concentrator 
must work to full capacity. So the two preceding figures meanthat, in the former, 
adjustments can be made in the resource level necessary; for instance, the number of 
trucks and shovels may be reduced. Because fewer truck drivers and operators are 
needed, production cost will decrease and productivity will increase. If, on the other 
hand, the mining rate of 598,500 tpd were permanent, it means that at some point, 
sooner rather than later, mine production will collapse; it will not be able to feed the 
required tons of ore to meet the concentrator capacity. In this situation, there will be 
reserves that will not "at-hand" when needed; that is, it will be necessary to wait to 
extract the waste that covers them.
9.4.2 Safety and Risks Prevention. Because of changes in the law, changes in 
management responsiveness to social concerns, and simple economics (reducing 
absenteeism, for instance), safety and risks prevention are important operations issues. 
Generally, work-related accidents are caused by (1) management failure to provide a safe 
work environment and failure to train workers in safe methods and (2) worker 
carelessness or indifference about good safety practices. Managers have taken steps to 
eliminate hazardous conditions such as housekeeping, for instance, but worker 
indifference often continues to be a problem. So a good deal of effort is used to prevent 
or eliminate most of these through training and insisting that people follow safety 
procedures.
T-4099 160
9.4.3 Quantity. Controlling quantity means complying with commitments previously 
established. In the mining rate, for instance, it means that 630,000 tpd must be drilled, 
blasted, loaded, hauled, and crushed every day. Any operative phase that fails to meet 
its commitment will produce breakdowns in the others. Each operative phase is an 
indispensable requirement for the next phase; it is not possible to consider increasing the 
blasting volume without equivalently increasing the drilling volume. In a similar way, 
if both the loading and hauling capacities are not in balance, the result of this interaction 
will be limited by the one with lower capacity.
Controlling quantity involves goal setting (what is the right goal and how can a 
manager get his people to accept it?), motivation (helping people to strive to reach the 
goal and then rewarding them), and conversations to action. Many times quantity has 
been emphasized at the expense of other important goals (quality for instance).
This situation creates a number of serious disruptions; when the mining rate of
630,000 tpd is attained under forced conditions, for instance, material in excess is 
extracted from the pushbacks nearer the dumps; of course the farthest pushbacks receive 
almost no attention.
There is no free lunch; sooner or later, it will be necessary to recover this imbalance 
which, in turn, will generate conditions—both greater distance and grade, for instance- 
that can well prevent the accomplishment of the goals.
9.4.4 Quality. As may be seen, emphasis on quantity often results in less quality. 
Quality has many meanings and variances, depending on the context.
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In the mining rate example, it means extracting an average of 630,000 tpd from those 
places (pushbacks) previously established in the plans with specific ore attributes.
In these four areas of managerial concern management indicators work on the 
following issues:
(1) Absolute clarity about the Critical Factors of Success, that is, what must be 
measured. Critical success factors are those specific criteria that must be met if an 
organizational unit is to be successful in the short and long run (Anderson, 1984).
(2) Activities in the system under control must come from a working program, which 
must ensure clarity about standards or desired values for the variables to be 
measured, and their respective stability bands.
(3) The desired indicators must be both horizontally and vertically integrated, and must 
generate information simply and with great clarity. They must eliminate as much 
complexity as possible.
Standards must be established before any evaluation can be made. If control is 
thought of as the monitoring or regulating of a plan, then there has to be some pre- 
established target at which the plan’s efforts are aimed. Evaluative results must be stated 
in relation to something—the target—or they are meaningless statistics. Standards may 
be expressed in terms of money, time, quotas or any other factor that is measurable and 
understandable.
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Fulmer (1988) says that "Striving for Excellence" makes nice pep-talk terminology, but 
it results in rather vague goal-setting and even more confusing attempts at evaluation.
There are several ways that standards may be set. Statistical standards, sometimes 
called historical standards, are based on an analysis of past experience. Meeting the 
standards of past performance is a poor motivator and proves very little, even if 
accomplished. What is the value of meeting, or even exceeding, a standard from the 
past? Fulmer (1988) says that one characteristic about competing with oneself is that one 
always wins, or is it that one always loses? Most of the time, when one assumes that 
one is setting standards on statistical bases, there is actually another very important 
element entering in: the judgment of the standard setter.
Normative data are a useful adjunct in setting standards of performance in regard to 
profitability, market position, employee attitudes, and so forth. However, the final word 
about what will constitute satisfactory performance emerges from the company’s 
commitments with its customers; and the manager must know what this means. There 
is probably a close correlation between the manager’s subjectivity-objectivity ratio and 
success. At this point, the manager is neither a puppet of the statistical indicator nor a 
selfish dictator. The balance with which the manager uses data and intuition is the 
measure of his work.
Engineered standards are based on the objective, quantitative analysis of specific 
situations. These are computed or deduced on the basis of statistical observation of 
workers performance, and must include levels of achievement.
T-4099 163
Beer (1981) identifies three levels of achievement: (1) actuality: simply what we are 
managing to do now, with existing resources, under existing constraints; (2) capability: 
what we could be doing with existing resources, under existing constraints, if we really 
worked at it; and (3) potentiality: what we ought to be doing by developing our resources 
and removing constraints, although still operating within the bounds of what is already 
known to be feasible.
An example to illustrate this point is the mining rate at Chuquicamata mine. 
Actuality is the current mining rate of 630,000 tpd. In improving equipment utilization- 
especially delays during shift changes—the mining rate should reach 672,000 tpd. 
However, on occasion, when shovel and crusher operators and truck drivers have agreed 
to work continuously during the shift, the mining rate has been as much as 842,000 tpd. 
Is that the potentiality at Chuquicamata mine?
9.5 Implementing Management Indicators
A management indicator is derived from the return of investment measure (ROI). 
The ROI is income divided by invested capital. It is the most popular approach to 
incorporating invested capital into a performance measure. Conceptually, the ROI has 
appeal because it blends all of the major ingredients of profitability into one number; the 
ROI statistic by itself can be compared with opportunities elsewhere, inside or outside 
the company.
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From a practical standpoint, however, the ROI is an imperfect measure that should be 
used with caution and in conjunction with other performance measures (Homgren and 
Foster, 1987; Moyer, 1990). The ROI measure can often provide more insight into 
performance when it is divided into the components shown in Figure 9-8.
This approach is widely known as the Du Pont method of profitability analysis. The 
components of the Du Pont method lead to the following generalizations: the ROI is 
increased by any action that (1) decreases costs, (2) increases revenues, or (3) decreases 
invested capital, while holding the other two factors constant.
P r o f i t  M arg ins * C a p i t a l  T u rn o v e r = R e tu r n  o f  I n v e s tm e n t
V
O p e r a t i n g  P r o f i t Revenues O p e r a t i n g  P r o f i t
R evenues I n v e s t e d  C a p i t a l I n v e s t e d  C a p i t a l
Figure 9-8 Du Pont Method of Profitability Analysis (Source: Cost Accounting: 
A Managerial Emphasis by Homgren and Foster, 1987)
Put another way, there are two basic ingredients in profit making: capital turnover 
and profit margins. An improvement in either without changing the other will enhance 
return on invested capital (Homgren and Foster, 1987).
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The Chuquicamata mine is a production area where connection with the corporation’s 
profits is achieved through (1) the quality of the final product ore and (2) the cost that 
it represents in the whole process. The highly capital-intensive nature of the business 
creates the need to incorporate capital into a performance measure. An analogy with the 
ROI measure results in considering the mine capacity as capital, ore as operating profit, 
and total extraction as revenue. The mine capacity refers to the total extraction of 
material possible on the basis of design capacity of the assets in each operational level.
This simplified representation of capital performance for the mine is shown in 
Figure 9-9.
Mine C a p a c i t y
Tons o f  Ore
Tons o f  T o ta l  M a t e r i a l
Tons o f  Ore Tons o f  T o ta l  M a t e r i a l
Mine C a p a c i t y
( P r o f i t  M a rg in s ) ( C a p i t a l  T u r n o v e r )
( R e tu r n  o f  
I n v e s t m e n t )
Figure 9-9 Applying the Du Pont Method to Mining Operations
This level of disagreggating is only an articulated order of two common aspects in 
mine planning: the ore/waste ratio and the available capacity to accomplish a determined 
production plan.
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This concept aims to incorporate capital performance into all responsibility centers in the 
mine organization. The lower the organizational level, the more technical and 
operational the character of the variables will be.
A number of management indicator batteries have been shown earlier (the term 
"battery" is used to represent a set of articulated and integrated indicators). These 
indicators show how financial and non-financial data can be combined to provide for cost 
variance each level of the organization. A cost variance is the difference, in financial 
terms, between budgeted and actual performance or, as in these examples, between two 
successive periods. A key feature of a management indicator is that it can report 
variances to any explicative variable that assists management in identifying and evaluating 
the causes of favorable or unfavorable performance.
Other batteries of management indicators are shown in Figures 9-10, 9-11, and 9-12. 
Figure 9-10 shows an integrated scheme of Chuquicamata mining operations, and Figures 
9-11 and 9-12 show a disaggregation for loading and hauling phases.
9.5.1 Critical Factors of Success in the Loading Phase. An element considered 
transcendent to achieve the expected results in this phase is the reliability of the shoveling 
operation. Shovel breakdowns create operational discontinuities; these discontinuities 
cannot always be meet with appropriate flexibility; as a consequence, breakdowns have 
a strong incidence in the results. The breakdown rate then constitutes an explicative 











Delays are due to operational conditions—blasting, moves, movements, energy 
requirements, dangerous conditions—are also explicative variables that have incidence on 
the results. Already shown are the ways of obtaining key-relationships which directly 
affect cost performance.
The "service factor," which represents the design capacity to provide for the 
necessary resources in the maintenance of a piece of equipment, is another explicative 
variable that needs to be regulated. This is a crucial point. Service and support 
activities within the same company are virtual monopolies. Given that they represent 
more than significant cost contributions, there is a strong need to control and verify their 
efficiency. All of these elements have been considered to configure the battery of 
indicators in Figure 9-11. It is important to mention that these explicative variables are 
a particular feature of the Chuquicamata mining operations. However, it is apparent that 
the management indicators design can consider any kind of explanatory variable.
9.5.2 Critical Factors of Success in the Haulage Phase. One characteristic feature in 
this phase is the high dependence of the organization on its members for effective 
operation. Shovels are static elements (19 shovels at Chuquicamata); as a result, 
coordination and control processes are comparatively easier than in the case of trucks. 
An important number of variables intervene to accomplish results in hauling by truck. 
Distance, grade, quality of roads, etc. have incidence on results. Truck breakdowns 
have incidence, but it is quite lower than that of shovels. However, truck breakdowns 




































Delays as a result of mobilization of human resources and equipment, especially in 
shift changes and coffee breaks, and those relative to operational conditions, create a 
space of possibilities to permanently improve productivity. This situation creates the 
need for monitoring a wide spectrum of explicative variables.
Given the high-level economic resources involved in this productive phase, utilizing 
its design capacity becomes imperative. The service factor is also an important variable 
to be considered.
When there is a high technological variety and complexity between fleets, as is the 
case at Chuquicamata, it becomes imperative to contract external services for the 
maintenance work. This generates a certain observer relative to the efficiency of the 
internal maintenance service; even though comparisons must be taken with caution. 
Figure 9-12 shows how these considerations can be integrated and articulated. It is 
necessary to take into account that in both cases—loading and hauling—the level of 
disaggregation is only for reference.
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Chapter 10
THIRD STRATEGY : A MANAGEMENT INDICATORS SYSTEM TO 
IMPROVE THE MANAGER-TO-TASK FIT
10.1 A Computer-Based Tool: The Management Indicators System
In this section, a computer-based tool to extract data from databases and create 
management indicators in a number of formats will be shown. It will be called the 
management indicators system. This system manipulates data with specific calculations 
and logic before they are output. It has also graphic capabilities, and it displays data and 
trends in user-defined graphic formats. The management indicators system as a 
presentation software operates within the Microsoft (MS) Windows environment on 
industry-standard PCs and PC local area networks (LANs). The manager is the person 
ultimately responsible for making key decisions to meet the organization’s commitments. 
This person or group operates in an environment of complexity and uncertainty and faces 
bureaucratic constraints and political competition in the effort to reach on organizational 
decision. The manager has an overload of input and an inadequate capacity for ouput. 
A management indicators system provides information about how things are going, helps 
to improve organizational conversations, aids managers in arriving at a decision that 
others will support, and facilitates the implementation. A management indicators system 
can provide information about what is missing in the work that is already going forward. 
Effective action is only possible with appropriate informational support.
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A management indicators system is an attenuator because it allows managers to 
manage their information input adequately and achieve an appropriate appreciation for 
the situations relevant to them; and, it is an amplifier because it allows managers to 
"distribute the necessary action" Presentation of the system is organized in a sequential 
mode (see Figures 10-1 to 10-8), by starting with the main menu and then the subsequent 
options. Each figure represents a screen and options are displayed for viewing specific 
areas. Files can be exported to other applications and the user can print all that interests 
him. The package is very easy to modify, requires a minimum maintenance, and is very 
easy to use from a non-technical standpoint. The installation takes a few minutes.
An effective management reporting system requires that the right information be 
reported to the right people. The front-line supervisor requires detailed information to 
assist him in monitoring and controlling the activities for which he is responsible. 
Higher levels of management require the same information but in summary form, so that 
the manager may monitor the performance of his subordinates. The presentation of the 
system in Figures 10-1 to 10-8 is oriented towards the top managament of mining 
operations. However, it is apparent that the presentation software of the system can be 
easily modified to provide information to any organizational level, so that each manager 
can measure and evaluate the performance of his immediate deputies. The front-line 
supervisor will receive the most detailed information at the responsibility center level 
(for each fleet or piece of equipment, for instance). The general foreman will receive 
summarized information for each responsibility center under his responsibility.
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Figure 10-1 THE MANAGEMENT INDICATORS SYSTEM
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Figure 10-2 MANAGEMENT INDICATORS SYSTEM SCREEN # 3
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Figure 10-3 MANAGEMENT INDICATORS SYSTEM SCREEN # 4
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Figure 10-4 MANAGEMENT INDICATORS SYSTEM SCREENS # 5-6
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Figure 10-5 MANAGEMENT INDICATORS SYSTEM SCREENS # 7-8
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Figure 10-6 MANAGEMENT INDICATORS SYSTEM SCREEN # 9
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Figure 10-7 MANAGEMENT INDICATORS SYSTEM SCREEN # 10
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Figure 10-8 MANAGEMENT INDICATORS SYSTEM SCREEN » 11
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10.2 Conclusions
The conceptual framework underpinning this thesis is the management of complexity, 
and in particular the domains of action used by managers to cope with the complexity of 
their information/action space. These domains—namely, adjustments to the organization 
structure, the design of organizational conversations, and better manager-to-tasks fit—are 
aimed at achieving effectiveness to generate and coordinate action within the business 
organization. The strategies stemmed in exploring these domains imply the design of 
effective attenuators of "world" complexity and effective amplifiers of managerial 
complexity. Such attenuators and amplifiers have been called management indicators.
This study has focussed on the designing of a computer-based tool, the management 
indicators system, as part of a larger perspective on ontological design. The term 
"design" has not been used here in the narrow sense of a specific methodology for 
creating artifacts, but as a broad theory of design like that sought in the work of 
Alexander (1964), Flores (1982), and Winograd and Flores (1986). The most important 
design is ontological because it constitutes an intervention in the background of our 
tradition and because it attempts to deeply affect the way in which people are doing their 
job in the organization. As shown in the case study, one of the reasons for SIGEM’s 
failure was that it did not provide users a transparent access to the system. If users need 
the system, they must translate their actions into an unfamiliar domain such as the 
algorithms of a Query language. It does not matter how friendly this language have been 
qualified by the experts.
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A succesful word processing device lets a person operate on the words and 
paragraphs displayed on the screen, without being aware of formulating and giving 
commands. At the superficial level of "interface design" there are many different ways 
to aid transparency, such as special function keys (which perform a meaningful action 
with a single stroke), pointing devices (which make it possible to select an object on the 
screen), and menus (which offer a choice among a small set of relevant actions). All of 
these aids have been applied in developing the management indicators system shown 
earlier. However, more important is the design of the domains in which the actions are 
generated and interpreted.
The impact of the word processor comes not because the programs are "smart" but 
because they let people operate effectively in a systematic domain that is relevant to their 
work. A word processor can be used to manipulate text structures that have meaning to 
those who create and read them. This is exactly the sense of having a management 
indicators system in the firm. Its objective is to make the interactions transparent and 
provide a ready-to-hand tool that operates in the domain of commitments and 
conversations for action within the organization.
10.2.2 Organizational Issues. The domain of action of structural adjustments involves 
designing the communication channels in the organization in such a way as to maintain 
corporate cohesion while reducing the information needs of managers. Gerwin and 
Kolodny (1992) say what people have learned with confidence in the past ten years is 
what does not work.
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Schon (1971) says in turn that we have lost the stable state, and with its demise many of 
the organizational pillars have collapsed.
People, too are, slowly beginning to appreciate that their organizations are open 
systems, open to an increasingly turbulent and uncertain environment that can no longer 
be buffered at the boundaries of the organization. That environment enters from the top 
and from the bottom, via suppliers and through customers, on the back of technology and 
on the wings of unpredictability (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992), and when it comes face 
to face with the stable, bureaucratic structures that provided us with so much affluence 
in the 1950s and the 1960s, it cannot find a way to be accepted. The stable structures 
that started to shake in the 1970s began to crumble in the 1980s. Long hierarchies are 
poor at communications and particularly poor at communicating the changes emanating 
from an uncertain environment. Technological change is a major component of the 
turbulence in the environment.
Major technological changes induce significant organizational changes. They have 
immediate effects on the content of jobs and on the skills and qualifications of people. 
Operators have to understand what lies behind the black boxes that control their machines 
and equipment, and supervisors are confronted with new techniques, such as total quality 
management, they never even heard mentioned three years earlier.
Liu, et al. (1990) say that, at first, the technological changes do not modify the 
existing organization. In time, however, the old organization design becomes 
increasingly suboptimal with respect to the new technology.
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A new model of organization is evolving that promises to facilitate innovation in both 
the social and the technical subsystems of the organization and, more important, in their 
joint interaction (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1988; Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992). As shown 
in chapter 4, the new model has theory and concepts, design principles and processes, 
methodology, and experience associated with it but not prescribed solutions. It is local 
in its application because it is driven by the idea that there is organizational choice in 
every application (Gerwin and Kolodny, 1992). The parameters that inform that choice 
are "soft" factors such as values, culture, vision statements, and organizational 
philosophies. They underlie a new paradigm of work that assumes that commitment 
arises only out of involvement, open communications, and trust; that power equalization 
is needed for openness and collaboration to develop; and that all organizational members 
can grow and develop (Beer and Spector, 1985).
Technology is becoming increasingly complex. Its very nature is changing: the 
interdependencies it is based on are so great that its outcomes are increasingly 
unpredictable; it is abstract to most who must interact with it. The more complex 
technology becomes, the more dependent organizations become on their people to make 
the technology function effectively. That effectiveness will not be realized without a 
revolutionary change in how manage and organize the relationships at work.
A shovel operator in a major mining operation well can be operating a US$3 million 
piece of equipment; a truck driver a US$1.2 million truck. An idea exists, then, to 
recognize the good and the harm that people can do to and with the technology.
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With it comes an appreciation that an investment in the social system, for example, in 
training, is small compared with the cost of the assets. The corollary is that the cost of 
an uncommited employee can be incalculable when the total operation investment has 
become so high.
The economics of high technology operations that makes social system costs small 
compared with the costs of the technology, the complexity of technology that makes it 
increasingly dependent on the organization’s members if it is to function, the competitors 
who appear to have discovered alternative ways to organize and produce that are 
consistently more effective, the changing value systems stimulated by increased 
educational levels and a growing psychology of entitlement, all of these are putting 
enormous pressure on major mining organizations to reform the ways in which they 
organize themselves.
It is the confluence of all these factors that is changing the paradigm of work and 
with it the structural arrangements that will reinforce and sustain paradigmatic change. 
There proven design processes to accompany the design principles (Gerwin and Kolodny, 
1992). Steering committees of people who can provide sanction and support and 
resources and direction can ensure that innovative efforts will have the opportunity to be 
diffused across the organization and will not become isolated and encapsulated. Design 
committees composed of a vertical slice of people from the unit under design can ensure 
that the resources of the organization are used and ownership of the processes is assumed 
by those who have a vested interest in the redesign.
T-4099 187
Study committees and task forces can provide forums for everyone interested in 
influencing the outcomes to do so.
10.2.3 Improving Organizational Conversations. This strategy involves the design of 
processes which develop awareness about the commitments made in conversations, and 
reduce the chance of breakdowns in communications.
This strategy has been based on the theory of management and conversation such as 
developed by Flores (1982) and Winograd and Flores (1986). The basic points of the 
theory established are the following:
(1) Organizations exist as networks of directives and commissives. Directives include 
orders, requests, consultations, and offers; commissives include promises, 
acceptances, and rejections.
(2) Breakdowns will inevitably occur, and the organization needs to be prepared. In 
coping with breakdowns, further networks of directives and commissives are 
generated.
(3) People in an organization (including, but not limited to managers) issue utterances, 
by speaking or writing, to develop the conversations required in the organizational 
network. They participate in the creation and maintenance of a process of 
communication. At the core of this process is the performance of linguistic acts that 
bring forth different kinds of commitments.
In fulfilling an organization’s external commitment, its personnel are involved in a 
network of conversations.
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This network includes requests and promises to fulfill commitments, reports on the 
conditions of fulfillment of commitments, reports on external circumstances, declarations 
of new policies, and so on. The organization encounters requests and other external 
contingencies that it can deal with by making commitments that can be fulfilled by the 
activation of certain special networks o f recurrent conversations. In these recurrent 
conversations only certain details of the content of the conversations differ, not their 
general structure.
These networks of recurrent conversations are the core of organization. A person 
working within an organization is always concerned with questions such as "What is 
missing?" "What needs to be done?" and "Where do I stand in terms of my obligations 
and opportunities?" In situations where many people must act together, the problem of 
coordination becomes a crucial one. For many organizations it is a matter of survival. 
The networks of commitments and the conversations in which people participate are 
becoming larger and more complex, and the complexity of organizations has gone beyond 
the point where it can be controlled without appropriate tools.
Many systems designed by computer professionals are intended to facilitate the 
activity of an individual working alone. Although such tools—word processing, for 
instance—are useful, they leave out the essential dimension of collective work. In most 
work environments the coordination of action is of central importance. Computer-based 
tools—as the management indicators system—can be used in requesting, creating, and 
monitoring commitments.
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They can provide relevant answers to the question, "What do I need to do?" or better, 
"What is the status of my active commitments?"
This thesis is not proposing that a computer can "understand" conversations for 
action and their associated commitments within the organization. It is imposible to 
formulate a precise correspondence to the structure of the commitments listened to in a 
conversation. What this thesis is proposing is to make the user aware of this structure 
and to provide tools for working with it explicitly. As a first step, in chapter 2 was 
depicted the basic networks of conversation that constitute a mining business. This 
network was considered when the management indicators system was developed.
The question was, "Who makes requests and promises to whom, and how are those 
conversations carried to completion?" At a basic level a mining company can be treated 
as a unity, examining its conversations with the outside world—customers, suppliers, and 
providers of services. Thereafter, the analysis can comprehend the organization in detail, 
such as it was shown in the case study. Whatever the level selected, it is possible to 
identify some central conversations.
The most recurrent subject in corporative conversations is most probably financial; 
the most recurrent subject in divisional conversations is production. Secondary 
conversations deal with conditions of satisfaction for the initial ones: conversations about 
alteration of programs, conversations concerning operation budget, and conversations for 
preventing breakdown in the physical assets.
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There are surprisingly few basic conversational building-blocks (such as 
request/promise, offer/acceptance, and report/acknowledgement) that frequently recur in 
conversations for action. Winograd and Flores (1986) say that the gain from applying 
conversation theory in organizations has to do with developing the communicative 
competence. This includes the proper terminology, skills, and procedures to recognize 
what is missing, deteriorated, or obtruding—that is, what is broken-down—and the ability 
to cope with the situation.
People have experience in everyday dealing with others and with situations. 
Nevertheless, there are different levels of competence. Competence here does not mean 
correct gramatical usage or diction, but succesful dealing with the world, good 
managerial abilities, and responsibility and care for others.
Communicative competence means the capacity to express one’s intention and take 
responsibilities in the networks of commitments that utterances and their interpretations 
bring to the world. In their day-to-day being, people are generally not aware of what 
they are doing. They are simply working, and speaking, more or less blind to the 
pervasiveness of the essential dimensions of commitment. There exists then a domain 
for education in communicative competence: the fundamental relationship between 
language and succesful action. People’s conscious knowledge of their participation in the 
network of commitment can be reinforced and developed, improving their capacity to act 
in the domain of language.
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10.2.4 Improving the Manager-to-task Fit. This strategy entails the design of tools to 
allow the individual both to grow personally in relation to his organizational tasks and 
to amplify his output in the same context. The manager, as in the case of any other 
individual, develops beliefs of one kind or another, perceives things, processes data, and 
takes action. Every individual has idiosyncratic modes of doing each of these operations. 
These forms relate to cognitive capabilities (Davis and Olson, 1985) and to cognitive 
styles (Mitroff and Kitman, 1975).
The most important aspect in this domain can be established in terms of the generally 
accepted concepts of the ability to form mental models and the ability to use these models 
effectively in processing input and in generating output. Once again, attenuation and 
amplification processes are in operation.
While the possibilities for design in the first two strategies are in some sense 
unlimited, a constraint is present here: the natural limited capacity of the individual. 
Thus, if the context in which the manager is going to operate has flexible structures 
facilitating his shaping of the organizational tasks, it clearly makes sense to select the 
"right" manager for a particular action space in terms of cognitive style and personal 
capacities. This implies a "sub-strategy" of moving individuals into different—and more 
suitable—action spaces (Espejo and Watt, 1988).
In all but the most routine jobs, a worker functions in some ways as a manager, 
requesting and initiating actions that affect the work of others.
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As shown in this thesis, an essential part of all work in organizations is the dimension 
of coordination that is highlighted in the manager’s job. In Chapter 7, particular 
consideration was given to the planning process and mutual adaptation as coordination 
mechanisms. The animus state of being in charge provides a basis for mutual adaptation.
Heidegger (1962) demonstrates that the essence of our intelligence is in our 
thrownness, not our reflection. Similarly, Maturana (1970, 1978) shows that biological 
cognitive systems do not operate by manipulating representations of an external world. 
It is the observer who describes an activity as representing something else. Human 
cognition includes the use of representation, but is not based on representation. When 
we accept (knowingly or unknowingly) the limitations imposed by a particular 
characterization of the world in terms of objects and properties, we do so only 
provisionally.
There always remains the possibility of rejecting, restructuring, and transcending that 
particular blindness. This possibility is not under our control, the breakdown of a 
representation and jump to a new one happens independently of our will, as part of our 
coupling to the world we inhabit (Winograd and Flores, 1986).
The management indicators system has been developed to help managers of mining 
operations to manipulate formal structures of their doing and the deductions that can be 
made from them, while leaving the "hard questions" open to their own interpretation. 
The system has been developed to be used both as an complexity filter and as an 
effective coordination mechanism.
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This latter makes the difference, and this is a matter of crucial importance which has 
been given little attention in the literature of information for management. If somehow 
managers manage their information input adequately and achieve an appropriate 
appreciation of the situations relevant to them (the filtering capability of their information 
systems), they may still fail to be effective because of their inability to "distribute the 
necessary action." The management indicators system has been designed in this 
direction.
In ontological design, we are doing more than asking what can be built. Few would 
argue that it is not of benefit.
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